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INTRODUCTION

It is a fundamental principle of law in the United States that the government
must make laws known to people since people must obey the laws.1 Closely
bound with notice of the law is the people’s need to have access to the law.2 The
basis for making the law known lies in the due process requirement that before
the taking of “life, liberty, or property”3 a person needs notice and an opportunity
to be heard.4 A part of this requirement is that people have “fair notice” or
“warning” of the conduct that the law prohibits or requires.5
In order for people to know the law, it has to be available. Although everyone
is presumed to know the law,6 this presumption does not apply “when the law
in question is not contained in any official publication where laws of the enacting
legislative body are normally found.”7 As the court in United States v. Burgess
stated:

United States v. Burgess, No. 133066, 1987 WL 39092, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1987).
See Banks & Bros. v. W. Publ'g Co., 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886) (discussing the
connection between access to the law and notice of the law); Bldg. Offs. & Code Adm’rs v.
Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980) (discussing the connection between access
to the law and notice of the law).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 314 (1950) (“An elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding . . . is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”); Lambert v. California,
355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (“Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of
notice . . . . Notice is required before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are
made, before penalties are assessed. Notice is required in a myriad of situations where a penalty
or forfeiture might be suffered for mere failure to act.”).
5 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) (“[T]he notion that persons have a right to
fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties . . . is fundamental to our
concept of constitutional liberty.”); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes,
J.) (“[F]air warning should be given to the world . . . of what the law intends to do if a certain
line is passed.”); Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 790 F.2d
154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he due process clause prevents . . . validating the application of
a regulation that fails to give fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires.”).
6 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“Based on the notion that the law is definite
and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law.”); JOHN SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE 368 (6th ed., Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1920) (“[I]gnorance of the law is no
excuse for breaking it . . . . The rule is also expressed [as] the form of a legal presumption that
every one knows the law . . . . [T]he law is . . . definite and knowable; it is the duty of every
man to know that part of it which concerns him . . . .”).
7 Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apartments, Ltd., 436 F. Supp. 1125, 1146 (N.D. Okla. 1977). In
Armstrong, the alleged applicable statute had never been codified in the United States Code and
was only referenced in a footnote. Id. at 1138. The court held that the defendant’s due process
rights were violated because there was no way to have notice of this act. Id. at 1145-46. A
reference in a United States Code footnote or in a specialized treatise was not “reasonable
1
2
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The Constitution does not say anything directly about the
publication of laws. But the term “law” itself, as used in the
Constitution, embodies the principle that laws must be made
known to those who are required to obey them. The
Constitution assumes that laws . . . must be disseminated to the
public . . . . The very nature of republican government requires
that the most important actions of Congress, the laws it enacts,
be made known to the citizenry.8
The First Circuit Court of Appeals explained how both knowledge of the law
and access to the law are important for due process:
Due process requires people to have notice of what the law
requires of them so that they may obey it and avoid its
sanctions. So long as the law is generally available for the public
to examine, then everyone may be considered to have
constructive notice of it; any failure to gain actual notice results
from simple lack of diligence. But if access to the law is limited,
then the people will or may be unable to learn of its
requirements and may be thereby deprived of the notice to
which due process entitles them.9
A powerful example of the dire consequences that can occur when a person
lacks knowledge of and access to the law arose during President Roosevelt’s New
Deal. At the beginning of Roosevelt’s administration, there was a proliferation
of executive and administrative orders and federal administrative regulations.10
notice to defendants or the general public of the existence and content of this special
legislation.” Id. at 1146.
8 United States v. Burgess, No. 133066, 1987 WL 39092, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1987). The
court in Burgess discusses at length the history of support for publication of laws, and
concludes: “The teaching of this history and the cases . . . is that Congress must
provide fair warning of legislative enactments which affect substantial rights, especially those
under which criminal penalties may be imposed.” Id. at *11. For an extensive discussion of
publication of laws in the United States, see Harold C. Relyea, The Coming of Secret Law, 5 GOV’T
INFO. Q. 97, 98-106 (1988); see also ELIZABETH GOITEIN, THE NEW ERA OF SECRET LAW 1214
(2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Era_of_Secret
_Law.pdf (“The United States’ own history reflects an early and robust commitment to making
the law publicly known and available.”).
9 Bldg. Offs. & Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980).
10 Erwin N. Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law - A Plea for Better Publication of Executive
Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 198-201, 204 (1934). Griswold listed, among many different
promulgations, 674 Presidential Executive Orders issued in the first fifteen months of
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In 1934, Erwin Griswold wrote in a famous and influential article of the “chaos”
that anyone encountered when trying to find, access, and use any of these
documents.11 As an epigraph for his article, Griswold quoted Jeremy Bentham:
“We hear of tyrants, and those cruel ones: but, whatever we may have felt, we
have never heard of any tyrant in such sort cruel, as to punish men for
disobedience to laws or orders which he had kept them from the knowledge
of.”12 The quote is from Bentham’s Petition for Codification in which he argues for
a codification of law that would allow “each of us” to “learn, and on each
occasion know, what are his rights, and what are his duties.”13 The conditions
Griswold described prompted his similar concern for the need to know the
law—to know rights and duties. Griswold was especially concerned about the
difficulty in identifying the new regulations because many of them affected
“everyday affairs of the citizen” while others provided for criminal penalties and
sanctions.14
The situation was so chaotic that even government officials did not know the
law. In one case, the government indicted an individual for violation of a
regulation provision.15 No one knew that the provision did not exist until the
case was on appeal before the Supreme Court.16 The non-existent provision
arose in another Supreme Court case, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, in which the

Roosevelt’s first term. The National Recovery Administration alone produced 2,998
administrative orders and “numerous regulations and sets of regulations,” published among
5,991 press releases and totaling over an estimated 10,000 pages. Numerous other new
agencies also issued regulations and orders. Id. at 198-202.
11 Id. at 204. Part of the difficulty of accessing these documents was that there was no one way
of publishing these works and no compilation. Id. at 204; 204 n.22; see John A.
Fairlie, Administrative Legislation, 18 MICH. L. REV. 181, 198-200 (1920) (describing in detail the
complete lack of order and the confusion that existed in preparing and publishing the wide
variety of federal administrative materials).
12 Griswold, supra note 10, at 198 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, Petition for Codification, in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 547 (J. Bowring Ed. 1843)).
13 Bentham, supra note 12, at 547.
14 Griswold, supra note 10, at 203, 204. Despite the importance of these documents, there was
no collection of all of them: “An attempt to compile a complete collection of these
administrative rules would be an almost insuperable task for the private lawyer. It seems likely
that there is no law library in this country, public or private, which has them all.” Id. at 204.
15 The case was United States v. Smith, 293 U.S. 633 (1934). For a discussion of the facts of
the case, see the sources cited in footnote 16.
16 The Solicitor General had to move to dismiss the case. For a detailed discussion of the
circumstances of the United States v. Smith case, see James. H. Ronald, Publication of Federal
Administrative Legislation, 7 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 66 (1938); KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE
STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 68-69 (2001). See also Oil
Suit Dismissed in Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1934, at 6 (providing a report of the
dismissal of the case).
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Court expressed its displeasure with the situation.17 Griswold’s article and the
problems in these cases led to the creation of the Federal Register.18
The circumstances that led to the creation of the Federal Register highlighted
that providing the law is more than just publishing the law. The law needs to be
available for the public in a meaningfully accessible way. Bentham’s quote notes
the actions of a tyrant who does not allow citizens to know the law.19 Another
tyrant comes to mind when considering the need for accessible law. Just making
the law known by publication is not enough. The Roman Emperor Caligula
imposed taxes under laws that were initially not made known to those affected.20
When Caligula did publish the laws, they were not easily accessible.21 He had
them posted, but in a way that made access difficult.22

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 412 (1935) (“Whatever the cause of the failure
to give appropriate public notice of the change in the section, with the result that the persons
affected, the prosecuting authorities, and the courts, were alike ignorant of the alteration, the
fact is that the attack in this respect was upon a provision which did not exist.”). See Ronald,
supra note 16, at 66-67 for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s actions in Panama Refining, also
known as the “hot oil case.” At the request of the Supreme Court in Panama Refining, the
Solicitor General filed a supplemental memorandum to discuss what created the situation and
to explain the accessibility to the public of government codes and regulations. Supplemental
Memorandum for Respondent at 1, 12-18, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1934)
(Nos. 135, 260), reprinted in PHILIP B. KURLAND & GERHARD CASPER, 28 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
329-32 (1975).
18 See Ronald, supra note 16, at 66-69 (discussing events leading to the creation the Federal
Register). Griswold included in an appendix to his article “a draft of a bill to provide for the
publication of rules and regulations.” Griswold, supra note 10, at 212, 214 app. Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) was decided on January 7, 1935. The bill that would become
the Federal Register Act was introduced on March 1, 1935. Ronald, supra note 16, at 69.
Representative Emanuel Celler, who introduced the bill, quoted Griswold’s article in his
congressional speech. 79 CONG. REC. 4788 (1935). House Report 280 was based on Griswold’s
article. See H.R. REP. NO. 74-280, at 3 (1935) (referencing Griswold’s article). See Relyea, supra
note 8, at 104-06 (providing a detailed history of the Federal Register).
19 Bentham, supra note 12.
20 GAIUS SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, 1 SUETONIUS 469 (John C. Rolfe trans., 1914).
21 Id.
22 Id. (“When taxes of this kind had been proclaimed, but not published in writing, inasmuch
as many offences were committed through ignorance of the letter of the law, he at last, on the
urgent demand of the people, had the law posted up, but in a very narrow place and in
excessively small letters, to prevent the making of a copy.”). Caligula’s actions have often been
cited in court opinions and other works to illustrate unacceptable government action. See, e.g.,
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 834 n.* (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("For
application of a law that sends people to prison for years where Congress has not made it clear
they should be there is only another device as lacking in due process as Caligula's practice of
printing the laws in small print and placing them so high on a wall that the ordinary man did
not receive fair warning." (citation omitted)).
17
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Caligula’s actions demonstrate control over access which can interfere with
the ability of people to know and obey the law. In Banks & Brothers v. West
Publishing, Justice David Brewer, in discussing people’s need to know the law,
observed that “[t]he laws of Rome were written on tablets and posted, that all
might read, and all were bound to obedience.”23 He noted, however, that Caligula
provided the law on tablets, but in such a way that they were not accessible and
the citizens could not know the law.24 Justice Brewer saw a critical connection
between knowledge of the law and access to the law:
[I]t is a maxim of universal application that every man is
presumed to know the law, and it would seem inherent that freedom
of access to the laws, or the official interpretation of those laws,
should be co-extensive with the sweep of the maxim.
Knowledge is the only just condition of obedience.25
The context for the court’s discussion of knowledge of and access to the law
was a case involving the question of whether a state could hold copyright in the
decisions of judges.26 The court determined that this control of access through
copyright was inconsistent with the people’s need to know the law.27
Copyright is a means of controlling access. A copyright holder can control all
aspects of use of a work, and even restrict or deny access to the work.28 To allow
copyright claims over “the law” can lead to severe restrictions on public
knowledge and access. Historically, these restrictions meant that the law was
accessible only to the extent the copyholder authorized publication and
dissemination of the work. The public might not have access until there was an
official authorized publication, which was a lengthy time to wait. In modern
times, people trying to access the law find that they have to pay to access the law
and they cannot copy or print the law. Some law may be totally inaccessible if
the copyright holder does not provide access to older versions.

Banks & Bros. v. W. Publ'g Co., 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886).
Id.
25 Id. (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 56-57.
27 See id. at 57, 60-61. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94 for more discussion of this
opinion.
28 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 130 (1932) (“The owner of the copyright, if he
pleases, may refrain from vending or licensing and content himself with simply exercising the
right to exclude others from using his property.”). Id. at 127. See L. Ray Patterson, On
Copyrighting Law, 13 GA. ST. B. J. 60, 60 (1976) (“For copyright gives the copyright proprietor
an ownership of the copyrighted work so as to enable him to deal with the work as his private
property. The essence of property is the right to exclude others from its use . . . .”).
23
24
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This Article reviews court decisions, spanning three centuries, that have
upheld the principle that people need knowledge of and access to the law over
the proprietary rights of copyright holders. The Article highlights and analyses
three recent decisions that are under the umbrella of this principle although the
courts in these cases found different ways to place works under the umbrella.
The Article also discusses the open issues regarding whether “the law” can be
copyrighted. It details the concerns about standards incorporated into and
enforceable as law. The situation regarding access to these works raises issues
similar to those arising prior to the creation of the Federal Register. The Article
asserts that supporting unfettered access to the law and the public benefits that
flow therefrom should outweigh copyright concerns.
Section I discusses the historical development of the government edicts
doctrine. This doctrine, developed in the nineteenth century, shields government
works from copyright and supports people’s need for knowledge of and access
to the law. This section contains a deeper look at the facts of two important cases
that shaped the doctrine: Banks v. Manchester and Nash v. Lathrop.29 Judges and
others often limit the discussion of these cases to their holdings, a few quotes or
just a citation. A review of the facts of these cases reveals that the cases involved
self-interested decisions of copyright holders who were controlling access to the
law. This section includes a discussion of documents not referenced in the Banks
v. Manchester opinion or record that reveal the voice of another player in the Banks
v. Manchester story.
Section II contains a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court
decisions in the Georgia v. Public.Resources.Org litigation. In Georgia v.
Public.Resources.Org, Inc.,30 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and further refined the
government edicts doctrine. The discussion in Section II includes an assessment
of the importance of the Supreme Court decision and its affects.
Section III discusses how the decision in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org did not
reach certain areas of concern for access to law. This section discusses the
analysis of how to treat works referenced in the law, model codes adopted into
law, and standards incorporated by reference. This section includes discussion
and analysis of two recent cases that have reviewed alternative means of
addressing people’s need for knowledge of and access to the law. One case is
American Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.31 In this case, the
D.C. Circuit Court applied fair use analysis to the copying and posting of
privately created standards incorporated by reference into federal regulations.32
The other recent case is a United States Southern District of New York decision:

Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Nash v. Lathrop, N.E. 559 (Mass. 1886).
Georgia v. Public Resources.Org, Inc., 140 S.Ct. 1498 (2020).
31 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
32 Id. at 447.
29
30
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International Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc.33 The extensive opinion in this case
is the first to apply the Supreme Court’s Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org decision to
works created by private parties but adopted into law. The decision, which
addresses model codes adopted into law, reviews not only the Supreme Court’s
decision, but decisions concerning model codes and incorporated standards. It
also reviews the D.C. Circuit Court decision on fair use in American Society for
Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.
Section IV summarizes three centuries of judicial support for the principle
that people need knowledge of and access to the law. These decisions have
upheld this need over the interests of copyright holders. It also highlights the
deeply concerning continuing issues with standards incorporated into law,
including examples of how lack of access has affected court decisions. It
discusses the role of government and of non-government innovators in
enhancing access to the law while noting how copyright controls limit this
enhancement. Section V concludes.
II. HISTORICAL SUPPORT
Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court and
other courts affirmed that public access to the law outweighed the rights of
copyright holders.34 These decisions formed the basis of and provided
boundaries for the government edicts doctrine. Under this doctrine, government
works that fall within the doctrine are not copyrightable, thus supporting public
access. These decisions are under the umbrella of the principle that members of
the public need unfettered access to the law. In the twenty-first century, these
decisions also continue to provide a base for decisions regarding works that
could be under the umbrella but that are not covered by the government edicts
doctrine.
A. WHEATON V. PETERS

In the 1834 case of Wheaton v. Peters, the Court considered a dispute between
the former Supreme Court reporter, Henry Wheaton, and his successor, Richard
Peters, regarding Peters’ unauthorized republication of Wheaton’s reports.35 In

International Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., 17 CIV. 6261 (VM), 2020 WL 2750636
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020).
34 For a discussion of the Supreme Court cases, see L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce,
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36
UCLA L. REV. 719, 731-40 (1989).
35 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 593-94 (1834). In this case the Court made the historic
determination that copyright in published works exists only under statutory law. Id. at 662. For
an extensive discussion of the Wheaton decision, see Craig Joyce, “A Curious Chapter in the
History of Judicature”: Wheaton v. Peters and the Rest of the Story (of Copyright in the New Republic), 42
33
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a unanimous opinion, the Court concluded “that no reporter has or can have any
copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges
thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”36
The Court offered no discussion, supporting authority or rationale for this
declaration that written judicial opinions were uncopyrightable. While the Court
did not provide any discussion, the members of the Court heard the arguments
of Peters’ counsel. These arguments emphasized the need to keep the opinions
free of copyright.37 Peters’ counsel cautioned that “[i]f statutes or decisions could
be made private property, it would be in the power of an individual to shut out
the light by which we guide our actions.”38
The Court did not directly address whether Wheaton or any reporter could
retain copyright in the parts of the reports he created. The Court remanded the
case for further determination as to whether Wheaton complied with the federal
copyright statute.39 The Court’s remand of the case inferred that while the
opinions contained in Wheaton’s reports were not copyrightable, he could
possibly claim copyright in some portion of his reports.40
B. BANKS V. MANCHESTER AND NASH V. LATHROP

Over fifty years after Wheaton, the Court in Banks v. Manchester affirmed and
expanded the determination in Wheaton that judicial opinions were not
copyrightable.41 The decision offers little discussion. For its holding, the Court
relied on Nash v. Lathrop, a Massachusetts decision based on contract rather than

HOUS. L. REV. 325, 325-391 (2005). See also L.R. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 203-12 (1968) (discussing the Wheaton case).
36 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 668.
37 Counsel for Peters described judicial opinions as “the law of the land.” The reports
constituted their dissemination. He stressed that: “Whether legislative acts, or judicial
constructions or decrees, knowledge of them is essential to the safety of all . . . . [L]aws . . .
should be universally diffused . . . . [T]o make ‘reports’ the subject of exclusive ownership,
would be to directly interfere with these fundamental principles.” Publication of the laws did
not convey ownership of the laws. Id. at 619-20 (Precis of Argument by Counsel for Peters).
38 Id. at 621 (Precis of Argument by Counsel for Peters). He noted the “evils incident to every
publication which can be secured by copyright.” If there were copyright in the cases, these
“evils” could include charging “inaccessible prices” or allowing a publication “to go out of
print.” Given that a copyright holder had “exclusive enjoyment” over the works, he questioned
whether this power could be “asserted, with all its consequences, over the decisions of the
highest judicial tribunal . . . .” Id.
39 Id. at 667-68.
40 See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 649 (1888) (discussing the remand of the case in
Wheaton). See also discussion infra note 89 (providing additional discussion from the opinion in
Callaghan).
41 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
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copyright.42 At first there does not seem to be much to the opinion in Banks v.
Manchester. In court opinions and articles, judges and others often reduce the
decisions in Banks v. Manchester and in Nash to a few quoted passages. A review
of the arguments of counsel for Manchester, however, reveals the arguments for
access to the law. Additionally, the facts of both cases reveal aggressive actions
of publishers to control and limit access to judicial opinions in order to further
their own interests. Documents not referenced or included in the Banks v.
Manchester record also reveal the nature of the publisher’s actions in that case.43
The details show how these decisions upheld public access over the rights of
copyright holders.
1. Nash v. Lathrop
For insight into the holding in Banks v. Manchester, it is helpful to start with a
review of the case the Court cites, Nash v. Lathrop. A review of Nash reveals that
it was an appropriate choice for reference given the efforts of a publisher to
control access to judicial opinions. In Nash, the publisher, Little, Brown, entered
into a contract under state law to publish reports of state court opinions.44 The
court addressed whether this contract gave Little, Brown the right to prohibit
copying or other access to opinions until after it published the reports.45
Little, Brown had been content to allow access to court opinions and
publication by legal newspapers prior to the publication of the opinions in its
reports. This publisher, however, acted to limit all access once it had a concern
about competition. The Reporter of Decisions, John Lathrop, with the consent
of Little, Brown, had been allowing John Nash access to the opinions to make
copies and abstracts for publication in his daily legal newspaper.46 West
Publishing, Lawyer’s Cooperative and other publishers then “availed themselves
of the liberty thus granted” to Nash.47 These publishers were preparing and
selling bound reports of the opinions, thus competing with Little, Brown.48
Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 560 (Mass. 1886).
See infra text accompanying notes 65-75 (describing documents that Capital Printing and
Publishing Company provided to its subscribers).
44 Nash, 6 N.E. at 560.
45 Id. at 560 (discussing why the court chose not to decide the case on copyright grounds but
instead examined the “narrower question” of whether the state’s contract with the publisher
gave the publisher the power to deny public access until publication).
46 Id. at 559-60. See About the Reporter’s Office Statutory Duties & History of the Office, MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/about-the-reporters-office (last visited January 7,
2022) (discussing details of the Nash case); see also Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 560 (explaining
that publication in this newspaper would have been in advance of Little, Brown’s publication
in its reports).
47 Nash, 6 N.E. at 560.
48 See id. (describing how these other publishers were publishing reports in competition with
Little, Brown in spite of Little, Brown’s state contract).
42
43
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Facing this competition, Little, Brown decided that no one, including Nash,
should have access to the opinions.49 Little, Brown instructed the Reporter of Decisions
to not allow Nash to make copies of the opinions, and the Reporter of Decisions
complied.50 Little, Brown had effectively stopped all access to the opinions due to a perceived
threat to its economic interests.
Nash petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Reporter of Decisions (Lathrop) to allow access to the
opinions in the Reporter’s custody.51 The court held that although Little, Brown
had an exclusive right to publish the reports, it could not suppress public access
to the opinions until it had printed its reports.52 The court started its discussion
with the principle of access to the law:
The decisions and opinions of the justices are the authorized
expositions and interpretations of the laws, which are binding
upon all the citizens. They declare the unwritten law, and
construe and declare the meaning of the statutes. Every citizen
is presumed to know the law thus declared, and it needs no
argument to show that justice requires that all should have free
access to the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy
to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the earliest
knowledge of the public the statutes, or the decisions and
opinions of the justices.53
The court determined that there was state support for public access to judicial
opinions.54 The court then reviewed and discussed the statute governing the
contract with the publisher.55 The statute and contract did not “prohibit the

Id.
Id.
51 Id. at 559. Little, Brown argued that it had “the exclusive right” to publish the opinions and
could control or deny access. Id. at 559-60.
52 Id. at 563. The publisher did not have the right “to restrain any persons from procuring
copies of [the opinions], whether for their own use, or for publication in the newspapers or in
law magazines or papers.” Id. at 560-61.
53 Id. at 560. The inclusion of the language “earliest knowledge” refers to the context of the
Nash case: the publisher cannot prevent the public from having the earliest available access to
the opinions rather than having to wait for publication.
54 Id. at 561. As evidence of this support, the court noted the reporter had “always” allowed
free access to the opinions. To further facilitate this access, a state statute provided for the
establishment of a location for the public to examine court opinions. These new facilities
expanded previous access. The reporter had previously kept the opinions in his private office
or even at his home. This statute establishing a location was “recognition of the common right
to the knowledge of the opinions of the justices.” Id.
55 Id. at 561-62.
49
50
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reporter from allowing the public the right to examine the opinions, or to prepare
copies or extracts.”56 The court noted that the legislature could pass laws
“regulating the mode” of promulgating statutes and judicial opinions to ensure
“accuracy and authority.” The legislature could not, however, pass a law that
would prohibit statutes and opinions to be “made known to the public.”57
The court in Nash recognized the importance of the right of the public to
have knowledge of judicial opinions and to access them. At the end of its
opinion, the court stated that “the general current of the cases supports the
principles upon which our decision rests.”58 The cases the court cites are all
copyright cases, including the lower court decision in Banks v. Manchester.59 The
suggestion, then, is that there cannot be control over court opinions that would
restrict or prohibit knowledge of and access to those works.
2. Banks v. Manchester
In Banks v. Manchester, the plaintiff publisher, Banks & Brothers, decided to
assert total control over access to judicial decisions like the publisher of opinions
in Nash.60 Banks & Brothers obtained the right to publish decisions of the Ohio
courts through an assignment from the company with whom the state of Ohio
had contracted.61 Once Banks & Brothers obtained this right, they aggressively
exercised control over access to and publication of the opinions.62
In 1884, Banks & Brothers contracted with the Capital Printing and
Publishing Company (Capital Printing) to publish two future editions of the
Ohio State Reports containing Ohio court opinions.63 The court opinions would
be published in the Ohio Law Journal, a publication that Capital Printing owned.64
The facts as presented in the opinion and the pleadings and briefs do not tell
the whole story. Documents not referenced or included in the record provide
the voice of another player in the Banks v. Manchester litigation. These documents
are the notices that Capital Printing provided to subscribers to its publications.
Capital Printing provided notice to subscribers in an issue of the Ohio Law Journal

Id. at 562 (noting that it would be a “strained construction” to interpret the right “to publish
reports” to include this prohibition given the state’s emphasis on the people’s need for access
to the law).
57 Id. at 560.
58 Id. at 563.
59 Id.
60 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). The court’s decision is discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 78-81.
61 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. at 247. Banks became a party to this contract in 1882 after
the original contracting party, H.W. Derby & Co., assigned its rights to Banks.
62 See infra text accompanying notes 69-71 and note 75 (discussing these actions).
63 Id. at 247-48.
64 Id.
56
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dated October 4, 1884.65 Capital Printing provided a second notice in an issue
dated October 13, 1884 of another legal newspaper that Capital Printing owned,
The Weekly Law Bulletin.66 These documents reveal the extent of Banks &
Brothers attempt to control access to court opinions using copyright. I have
included copies of these notices as an Appendix to this article.
In its notices, Capital Printing described how it had been publishing in its
legal newspapers advance copies of Ohio Supreme Court decisions “as fast as
they are handed down by the Court.”67 Capital Printing highlighted that its
involvement in advance publication of the decisions supported expedited access.
It stated that since it could take as long as eighteen months for official publication
of the decisions which were binding law, prompt publication was “a necessity.”68
Capital Printing explained to its subscribers that Banks & Brothers had
asserted copyright in the court decisions. It stated that:
At the request of the present contractors, Messrs. Banks & Bros . . .
the use of these opinions for the purpose of advance publication, was
therefore stopped with the opening of the fall session of the
Supreme Court, and the right to such use was offered for sale
by the contractors.69
As Capital Printing explained, the offer was not for permission for anyone to
publish the opinions upon payment of a fee, but rather for “an exclusive right to
such advance publication under the protection of their copyright.”70 Capital
Printing lamented that it “had no choice” but to “buy the privilege” at “an
exorbitant price.”71
Capital Printing published opinions in a book supplement to an issue of the
Ohio Law Journal.72 The Ohio official reporter obtained copyright in the

Copyright of the Publication of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 6 OHIO L.J. 197 (Oct. 4,
1884) [hereinafter OHIO L.J.]. This notice appeared in issue number eight, which preceded the
issue that would have the cases in supplements.
66 12 WKLY. L. BULL. 193 (1884) [hereinafter WKLY. L. BULL.].
67 OHIO L.J., supra note 65, at 197. The notice in The Weekly Law Bulletin had similar language.
WKLY. L. BULL., supra note 66, at 193. Capital was apparently publishing the pre-report copies
in legal periodicals it owned without needing permission or a contract.
68 OHIO L.J., supra note 65, at 197; WKLY. L. BULL., supra note 66, at 193.
69 WKLY. L. BULL., supra note 66, at 193 (emphasis added).
70 WKLY. L. BULL., supra note 66, at 193.
71 Id. (“We repeat that it is not from choice that we what we now enjoy is the exclusive right
to the publication of these opinions, but we could obtain nothing less.”).
72 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 248 (1888). The supplement was to Volume Six, Issue
Nine of the OHIO LAW JOURNAL. These court decisions were to be included in upcoming
volumes of the Ohio State Reports.
65
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supplement prior to its publication in mid-October 1884.73 In November 1884,
Manchester published some of the opinions that were in the supplement in his
legal newspaper, the American Law Journal.74 Manchester’s defiant publication of
the decisions without authorization was met promptly with Banks & Brothers’
lawsuit to enjoin Manchester from publishing copies of these advancepublication decisions.75
The circuit court, citing Wheaton, determined that since there could not be
copyright in the work of judges, Manchester was free to publish “everything
which is the work of the judges, including the syllabus and the statement of the
case, as well as the opinion.”76 The circuit court viewed this decision to be “in
accordance with [the] sound public policy [that] in a commonwealth where every
person is presumed to know the law . . . the authoritative expositions of the law
by the regularly constituted judicial tribunals [are] public property, to be
published freely . . . .”77
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court.78 The Court in
Banks v. Manchester went beyond the Wheaton decision, which had focused on the
uncopyrightability of only judicial decisions, to state that there can be no
copyright in “the products of the labor done by judicial officers in the discharge
of their judicial duties.”79 According to the Court, under the copyright statute, a
“judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or decision, the
statement of the case, and the syllabus, or head-note” cannot “be regarded as
their author or proprietor.”80 The Court, citing Nash, highlighted that the judges’
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. at 248.
Id. at 249.
75 Id. at 249. See generally OHIO L.J., supra note 65, at 198; WKLY. L. BULL., supra note 66, at 193
(stating “All parties concerned will please take notice that Messrs. Banks & Bros. propose to
prosecute any one infringing in any manner on the copyright by which our publication of the
opinions of the Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commission is now protected.”).
76 Banks v. Manchester, 23 F. 143, 145 (1885). In dicta, the circuit court discussed that the
reporter could hold copyright in parts of the report that he had prepared. The court cited Myers
v. Callaghan, 5 F. 726 (1881) (one of the lower court opinions leading to the Supreme Court
decision in Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888)) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes
84-89). The court referenced Justice Joseph Story’s observations in Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas.
1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) that the Court in Wheaton thought that Wheaton could hold
copyright in his own work in the reports. For more discussion of Justice Story’s observations,
see footnote 89, infra.
77 Banks v. Manchester, 23 F. at 145.
78 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. at 254.
79 Id. at 253 (These “products” included “whatever work they perform in their capacity as
judges. . . .”). The Court noted that Manchester republished only the work of the judges which
was comprised of opinions and decisions, statements of the case, syllabi and headnotes. Id. at
251.
80 Id. at 253. The Court’s statements and discussion on this matter echo the arguments in
counsel for Manchester’s brief: “The judges are public officers, and their opinions are not their
73
74
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work could not be subject to copyright because “[t]he whole work done by the
judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which,
binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of
unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute.”81 Counsel for
Manchester in his brief offered some insight: “The laws should be published and
accessible to every one as soon as enacted by the legislature or declared by the
courts.”82 Given this principle, how could any state “consistently with this
acknowledged principle, deprive her citizens of the use of this most effective
instrumentality, and especially where the ground for such action is apparently based upon
the sacrifice of a public benefit to the advancement of a private end.”83
C. CALLAGHAN V. MEYERS

The Court in Banks v. Manchester addressed the copyrightability of the work
of judges, whether that work encompassed opinions or other materials published
in court reports. What the Court did not address was whether there could be
copyright in the work that the reporter prepared, thus leaving open the question
raised by the Court’s remand of the case in Wheaton.
In Callaghan v. Meyers, the Court determined that the reporter could hold
copyright in any portions of court reports that he prepared.84 Callaghan involved
a dispute between publishers over volumes of the Illinois reports for which the
state-appointed reporter had prepared all materials except the judicial opinions.85
Citing Banks v. Manchester, the Court reiterated that there could be no copyright
in judicial opinions or in the work of judges acting in their official capacity.86

acts as individuals, but as such officers; they have, therefore, no proprietorship in their
opinions.” Brief of Appellee, at 7, Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. (1888) (45), available at
https://archive.org/details/banksvmanchesterrecord/mode/2up (part of Agreed Record)
[hereinafter Manchester Brief].
81 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. at 253-54 (citing Nash, 6 N.E. at 559). The Court paraphrased
the excerpt from the Nash decision. Counsel for Manchester had cited Nash in his brief.
Manchester Brief, supra note 80, at 20.
82 Manchester Brief, supra note 80, at 15.
83 Manchester Brief, supra note 80, at 16 (emphasis added).
84 Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 647 (1888). Callaghan and Banks v. Manchester were decided
within a month of each other in 1888. The opinion in Banks v. Manchester is dated November
19, 1888 (Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. at 244) and the opinion in Callaghan is dated
December 17, 1888 (128 U.S. at 617). The two decisions were also authored by Justice Samuel
Blatchford.
85 Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 645 (“[A]ll but the opinions of the court and what is contained in
those opinions is the work of the reporter, and the result of intellectual labor on his part.”).
See also id. at 620-621 (listing the portions of the reports that the reporter prepared in this
situation).
86 Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 647.
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The Court held, however, that the reporter could obtain a copyright for “the
matter which is the result of his intellectual labor.”87 The Court noted that the
decision in Wheaton had not directly addressed whether the reporter held any
copyright in materials he prepared, but the Court in Wheaton had remanded the
case. This remand implied that Wheaton could hold copyright in his work that
appeared in the reports.88 The Court in Callaghan, discussing the Wheaton
decision, observed that “If this court had been of opinion that there could not
have been a lawful copyright in the volumes of Wheaton’s Reports, it would have
been useless to send the case back to the circuit court . . . .” 89 The Court thus
distinguished between the work of judges and the reporter, although it did not
explain the basis for the difference as to materials that did not have the force of
law.
D. OTHER NINETEENTH CENTURY CASES

In addition to the Supreme Court, other courts in the nineteenth century
determined that there could not be copyright in government edicts, including
statutes.90 One of these cases stands out for its analysis. In Banks & Brothers v.
West Publishing (Banks v. West Publishing), the court rejected the argument that the
state had a copyright interest in the laws and judicial opinions of the state.91 The
official publisher of the state judicial opinions could not prohibit a competitor
from publishing those decisions.
Justice Brewer, writing for the court, opined that “Each citizen is a ruler, - a
law-maker, - and as such has the right of access to the laws he joins in making

Id. Only a statutory prohibition could keep a reporter from obtaining copyright in his work.
Preparing the work within the scope of his official duties, whether or not he received a salary
for this work, did not inhibit his ability to obtain a copyright. Id. at 647, 650.
88 Id. at 648-49.
89 Id. The Court further noted that Justice Story (who had participated in the Wheaton decision)
had stated the same conclusion in Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 649-50. In Gray, Justice Story stated that in Wheaton the remand “would
have been wholly useless and nugatory unless Mr. Wheaton’s marginal notes and abstracts of
arguments could have been the subject of a copyright.” Gray, 10. F. Cas. at 1039.
90 See, e.g., Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898) (holding that state statutes are not
copyrightable); Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61, 62 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866) (holding that state
statutes are not copyrightable); Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 604, 612 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851)
(holding that state judicial opinions are not copyrightable); Connecticut v. Gould, 34 F. 319
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1888) (holding that state judicial opinions are not copyrightable). But see Gould
v. Banks, 2 A. 886 (Conn. 1886) (holding that a state can hold copyright in state judicial
decisions). See Irina Y. Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in Primary Law Materials, 23
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 81, 84-89 (2000) (discussing nineteenth century cases).
91 Banks & Bros. v. W. Publ'g Co., 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886).
87

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss1/2

18

Jones: Under the Umbrella: Promoting Public Access to the Law

2021]

UNDER THE UMBRELLA

19

and to any official interpretation thereof.”92 The court emphasized that “freedom
of access to the laws” was “co-extensive” with the maxim that “every man is
presumed to know the law.”93
The court in Banks v. West Publishing did not rely on any authority, whether
common law precedent or statutory law, for its decision.94 Other courts that
developed and applied the common law government edicts doctrine also did not
rely on judicial or statutory authority. They grounded the doctrine in the
“principle that citizens should have uninhibited access to the laws that govern
them.”95 Later enacted federal copyright laws96 addressed the copyrightability of
Federal government works, but they were silent as to the copyrightability of state
government works.97 These later statutory developments, however, were not
based on and did not incorporate the government edicts doctrine which
continued to stand on its own.98
III. GEORGIA V. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.: REAFFIRMING AND
REFINING THE GOVERNMENT EDICTS DOCTRINE
Nineteenth century courts developed the government edicts doctrine based
on the principle that the people need to know and access the law. By the twentyfirst century, the doctrine that there could not be copyright in statutes, judicial
opinions and other government edicts was “longstanding public policy.”99
Despite this policy, there has still been controversy regarding copyright in “the
law.” This controversy comes from the claims of different parties than in many
of the nineteenth century cases. In the nineteenth century cases, the parties
involved were often reporters of decisions (Wheaton v. Peters) or publishers (Banks
v. Manchester; Banks & Brothers v. West Publishing). Publishers were sometimes not
Id. Justice Brewer later became a Supreme Court Associate Justice. U.S. Circuit Court
Judgeships and Judges, 1869-1911, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.circuit-court-judgeships-and-judges-1869-1911 (last visited January 7, 2022).
93 Banks v. West Publishing, 27 F. at 57.
94 See Dmitrieva, supra note 90, at 85 (“These maxims were so obvious to the court that it did
not support them with any legal authority.”).
95 Id. at 89.
96 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 8 (repealed 1976); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §
105.
97 See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 34, at 752-56 (discussing the consideration of copyright in
government documents in the development of both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts).
98 See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 34, at 751 (discussing the “two tracks” of copyright law
and how the nineteenth century decisions fit); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Long Live the Common
Law of Copyright!: Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc. and the Debate over Judicial Role in Copyright, 121
COLUM. L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2021) (“The doctrine is thus unequivocally a common law doctrine,
in the sense of originating and remaining outside the terms of the statute.”).
99 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
313.6(C)(2) (3d ed. 2017).
92
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a party to the case but provided the impetus for the case (Nash v. Lathrop).
Publishers arguing for open access were often doing so to further the
development of their own publications.100 In the twenty-first century, however,
states are often the enforcers of copyright. Publishers are still involved and
limiting access, but it is the state bringing the claim.101 In recent years, parties
challenge assertions of copyright over government edicts so that they can
provide free access to the law. States, however, use “copyright to thwart open
access to state-owned legal materials.”102
Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (PRO) is an organization challenging copyright
claims in government edicts in an effort to provide free access to the law. One
of PRO’s challenges to state claims of copyright resulted in a Supreme Court
decision in 2020. After having not considered the government edicts doctrine in
over 130 years, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and further refined the doctrine
in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (GA v. PRO).103
A. GEORGIA V. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC. DECISION

In GA v. PRO, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reaffirmed and further
refined the doctrine developed in the Wheaton-Banks v. Manchester-Callaghan trio
of cases. The Court confirmed that the doctrine applies not only to judicial works
but to the works of legislators.104 This reaffirmation of the doctrine was in the
context of reviewing whether annotations in the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) were copyrightable.105 The O.C.G.A. is the official code
of Georgia.106 PRO, a nonprofit organization that facilitates public access to legal
See, e.g., Banks & Bros. v. W. Publ'g Co., 27 F. 50 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886) (recognizing West
Publishing’s right to access and publish court opinions).
101 This description is of cases involving “government edicts.” In other modern cases, the
plaintiffs are non-government entities whose copyrighted works have been adopted or
incorporated into law, thus raising access issues. See discussion infra Section III (providing
discussion and analysis of cases involving model codes, standards and other works).
102 Eric E. Johnson, The Misadventure of Copyrighting State Law, 107 KY. L.J. 593, 601-06 (2019)
(discussing several state actions brought in recent years to protect copyright).
103 GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. 1498, 1504 (2020).
104 Id. at 1506. The Supreme Court in the past applied the doctrine to federal and state judicial
opinions, but not to statutes. Other courts applied the doctrine to statutes. See, e.g., Howell v.
Miller, 91 F. 129, 137 (6th Cir. 1898) (“[N]o one can obtain the exclusive right to publish the
laws of a state . . . . [A]ny person desiring to publish the statutes of a state may use any copy
of such statutes . . . .”); Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61, 62 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866) (“[The]
compiler could obtain no copyright for the publication of the laws only; neither could the
legislature confer any such prior exclusive privilege upon him.”).
105 GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. at 1503–04.
106 Id. at 1504. The district court noted that this was “an unusual case because most official
codes are not annotated, and most annotated codes are not official.” Code Revision Comm'n
v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
100
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materials, posted online without permission the entire text of the O.C.G.A,
including the annotations.107 The Georgia Code Commission sued PRO for
copyright infringement.108 The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, holding that
the annotations were copyrightable.109
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the annotations
were under the government edicts doctrine and therefore not copyrightable.110
The court determined that “the People are the constructive authors of those
official legal promulgations of government that represent an exercise of
sovereign authority.”111 The court identified three critical markers to determine
“whether a work is authored by the People.”112 These markers were “the identity
of the officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the
process by which the work was created.”113
Applying this test, the Court determined the annotations were
“sufficiently law-like so as to be properly regarded as a sovereign work.”114 Thus,
“[a]s a work of the People” the annotations were not copyrightable.115
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision, but used a
different analysis for the conclusion that annotations in the O.C.G.A. were not
copyrightable.116 After discussing the historical development of the government
edicts doctrine in the Wheaton-Banks v. Manchester-Callaghan trio of cases,117 the
GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. at 1505-06.
Code Revision Comm'n v. Public.Resource.Org, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1354.
109 Id. at 1357. The court also held that PRO failed to prove fair use. Id. at 1361.
110 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1243, 1255 (11th Cir.
2018).
111 Id. at 1232. For an extensive discussion of the Court’s assertion that the People are
constructive authors of the law, see id. at 1239-42. The Court relies on several cases. The
Eleventh Circuit quotes the discussion in Banks v. West Publishing that “[e]ach citizen is a
ruler,—a law-maker . . . .” Id. at 1240 (citation omitted).
112 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d at 1232.
113 Id. at 1232. More detailed descriptions of the markers are: “the official who created the
work is entrusted with delegated sovereign authority, . . . the work carries authoritative weight,
and . . . the work was created through the procedural channels in which sovereign power
ordinarily flows.” Id. at 1232-33.
114 Id. at 1233.
115 Id. at 1233.
116 Georgia v. Public.Resources.Org, Inc., 140 S.Ct. 1498, 1506 (2020).
117 Id. at 1506-07. Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis by stating “[w]e begin with
precedent.” Id. at 1506. After discussing the Wheaton-Banks-Callaghan trio, the Chief Justice
noted that the Supreme Court in these cases construed the term author in the Copyright
statute. Id. at 1507. In a footnote, he cites the use of “author” in the 1790 and 1976 Copyright
Acts. Id. at 1507 n.1. His focus was on the Court’s decisions, not on the statutory wording. By
contrast, the Court of Appeals started its analysis with quotations from the Constitution and
the 1976 Copyright Act. Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d at
1236. After establishing this statutory connection, the Court of Appeals then discussed the
107
108
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Court determined that the “identity of the author” was at the heart of the
doctrine.118 Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, summarized the
doctrine drawn from these cases: “[O]fficials empowered to speak with the force
of law cannot be the authors of—and therefore cannot copyright—the works
they create in the course of their official duties.”119 According to the Court, these
previous Court decisions construed the statutory term “author.”120 In construing
the statutory term “author,” these decisions supported the principle that “no one
can own the law.”121
Unlike the Court of Appeals, the Court did not look further to find “the
People” as having constructive authorship in government edicts through the
work of these paid government employees.122 The Court also did not follow the
Court of Appeals’ requirement that the work in question have the authority of
law. Instead, Chief Justice Roberts, quoting from Banks, stated: “the doctrine
bars the officials responsible for creating the law from being considered
‘author[s]’ of ‘whatever work they perform in their capacity’ as lawmakers.”123
The Court refused to focus the test only on those works that had the “force
of law.”124 Rather than define which types of works constitute “the law,” the

historical precedent. Id. at 1236. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Long Live the Common
Law of Copyright!: Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc. and the Debate over Judicial Role in Copyright, 121
COLUM. L. REV. F. 1, 16-20 (2021) (discussing judicial role and alternative approaches to
decision making as evidenced in Chief Justice Robert’s opinion in GA v. PRO).
118 GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. at 1506-07. The Court’s discussion of Wheaton, Banks v. Manchester,
and Callaghan was a basic discussion with summaries of the holdings.
119 Id. at 1504. The Court followed the holding in Banks v. Manchester by stating that the “works”
include both “binding” and “non-binding” works. Id. at 1507 (citing Banks v. Manchester, 128
U.S. at 253). The Court explained that “Because judges are vested with the authority to make
and interpret the law, they cannot be the ‘author’ of the works they prepare “in the discharge
of their judicial duties.” GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. at 1507 (citation omitted). The Court further
applied this analysis to legislators. Id. The summary of the doctrine, then, refers to “officials.”
The Court also used this summary of the doctrine to explain the difference in the holdings in
Banks and Callaghan. The Court noted that the “explanatory materials” that the reporter
prepared in Callaghan were like those judges created in Banks v. Manchester. Id. The Court
distinguished the holdings in the two cases by stating that the materials in Callaghan “came
from an author who no authority to speak with the force of law.” Id. This distinction served
as a means for the Court to distinguish which works fit within the government edicts doctrine.
120 Id. at 1507.
121 Id.
122 The Court mentioned the Court of Appeals’ application of constructive authorship only in
the description of the Court of Appeals decision. GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. at 1505-06.
123 Id. at 1507 (quoting Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. at 253) (emphasis added).
124 Id. at 1511-12. The Court explained that “[i]f everything short of statutes and opinions were
copyrightable,” then a state could copyright “all of its judges’ and legislators’ non-binding legal
works” and charge a premium. Anyone who copied, distributed or displayed the works could
be subject to penalties. Id. at 1512-13. This discussion echoes the discussion in counsel for
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Court barred government officials from holding copyright in any works created
while they were acting in their official capacity.125 This prohibition opened a
broad array of government works to public access.
Chief Justice Roberts applied the test to the creation and adoption of the
O.C.G.A. annotations to determine whether they were within the government
edicts doctrine.126 The Court considered the Georgia Code Revision
Commission to be the author of the work under the Copyright Act since it
contracted with LexisNexis to create the annotations under a work-for-hire
arrangement.127 The Commission, acting with legislative authority, met the first
prong of the test. The creation of the annotations was within the Commission’s
“legislative duties” thus meeting the second prong of the test.128 The annotations
were within the government edicts doctrine and uncopyrightable.129
The Court did not discuss whether the State’s arrangements for providing
access to the O.C.G.A. met due process concerns.130 The plaintiff argued that it
provided adequate access.131 Amici curiae, as well as the defendant, raised issues
about the adequacy of this access.132 The Court of Appeals stated that it was
“unpersuaded” that Georgia had provided adequate access.133
Manchester’s brief asserting what would happen if there were copyright in the judicial
opinions. Manchester Brief, supra note 80, at 16-18.
125 GA v. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1513.
126 Id. at 1508-09.
127 GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. at 1508 (noting the Commission functioned “as an arm of” Georgia’s
legislature and was thus “wield[ing] the legislature’s authority” in contracting with Lexis).
128 Id. at 1509.
129 Id.
130 The Court’s one possible reference to adequacy of access was when it described the
unannotated version of the O.C.G.A. that LexisNexis provided online as “economy-class”
while “first class readers” could pay to access the full version. GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. at 1512.
131 See Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,
906 F.3d 1229, 1247 n.2 (11th Cir. 2018). The access was via CD-ROM copies in libraries
throughout the state and through an unannotated version that LexisNexis made available
online.
132 See Brief of Respondent at 13, GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150) (discussing
problems with the online unannotated code); Brief of American Library Association, et al. at
27-34, GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150) (discussing the inadequacies of
Georgia’s proposed alternatives to a freely available O.C.G.A.); Brief of Brendan Keefe at 35, GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150) (discussing the difficulties in accessing
copies of the O.C.G.A.); see also Brendan Keefe & Michael King,
Transparency
Should
Apply
to
Our
Lawmakers
Too,
11ALIVE,
https://www.11alive.com/article/news/investigations/transparency-should-apply-to-ourlawmakers-too/85-197258289 (last visited January 7, 2022) (reporting problems people faced
when trying to access print copies of the O.C.G.A.).
133 See Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d at 1247 n.2 (Public
ownership of the law by Georgia's ten and a half million citizens means . . . ‘the law’ is in the
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B. EFFECT OF GA V. PRO

The importance of the GA v. PRO decision for access to the law is the
reaffirmation of the government edicts doctrine134 and its application to a range
of government works, particularly those that state governments create. The
government edicts doctrine developed in the nineteenth century applied to works
at all levels of government. Yet, federal statutory copyright law has only
addressed copyrightability of Federal government works. Despite the existence
of the government edicts doctrine, states have long claimed copyright in
government works and continue to do so.135 The decision is a reminder of the
people’s right to access the law.
Although the decision in GA v. PRO dealt with the Georgia code and
annotations, other states also have the same arrangement regarding publication
of their codified laws and annotations relating to those laws.136 The implication
is that these annotated codes could also be in the public domain. In 2021,
however, the Georgia legislature took action that could lead to recognition of
copyright in code annotations.137 Depending on the interpretation of these
actions, other states could follow this lead. The Georgia legislature amended state
law to specify which portions of the O.C.G.A. “are not considered enacted by
‘public domain’ for whatever use the citizens choose to make of it.”). The Court of Appeals
also noted that the posted unannotated code was not “authoritative law.” Id.
134 Prior to the GA v. PRO decision, the Copyright Office in its Compendium referred only to
“longstanding public policy” when discussing the copyrightability of government edicts. U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.6(C)(2) (3d ed.
2017). After the GA v. PRO decision, the Copyright Office changed the language to cite the
GA v. PRO case for the government edicts doctrine. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.6(C)(2) (3d ed. 2021). The Compendium is “a nonbinding administrative manual” that does not carry any authoritative weight. GA v. PRO, 140
S.Ct. at 1510. It does, however, show the direct effect of the decision. See also Balganesh, supra
note 98, at 21 (“[The GA v. PRO decision] will also be remembered for furthering free public
access to laws, critical to notions of due process and the rule of law.”).
135 See Brief of the States of Arkansas et al. at 15 and app. A, GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. 1498 (2020)
(No. 18-1150) [hereinafter States’ Brief] (listing states (and the District of Columbia) that
copyright annotated codes). Recent studies show that numerous states assert copyright in state
government edicts. See, e.g., Leslie Street & David Hansen, Official Publications of State Laws:
Copyright Status and Terms of Use (compiled with status current to August 2018),
https://ursa.mercer.edu/bitstream/handle/10898/9937/Fifty%20State%20Survey%20corre
cted%5b3%5d.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (providing a chart listing state codes and
identifying which states claimed copyright in their codes).
136 States’ Brief at 14-19 and app. B, GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150)
(discussing how annotated codes in other states are the same as or similar to the O.C.G.A. and
identifying in an appendix a list of states that have similar arrangements). See Leslie A. Street
& David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? Why We Must Restore Public Ownership of Legal Publishing,
26 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 219–20 (2019) (noting that states have agreements with private
publishing companies to publish their laws and other government works).
137 2021 Ga. Laws 916. The changes were effective July 1, 2021.
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the General Assembly.”138 In addition, the legislature removed the Georgia Code
Commission’s oversight of Lexis’ preparation of the annotations.139 It is unclear
how these changes will affect copyright status. If annotations in a state code are
copyrighted, GA v. PRO affirms that the public must have access to the law itself
without restrictions. Requirements to accept publisher licensing terms before
accessing online versions of codes would not be acceptable. Another problem
would be that copyrighted material would encapsulate the text of law, making
the law inaccessible without permission.
In GA v. PRO, the state was a party in the case, unlike in many of the early
government edicts cases in which publishers, claiming copyright under contract
with a state, were the plaintiffs. This decision addresses the direct claims of a
state and affirms the application of the government edicts doctrine. The decision
provides a strong reminder to push states to fully open their laws for public
access.
IV. ALTERNATIVES FOR PROMOTING ACCESS TO THE LAW
The Court in GA v. PRO, by reaffirming and refining the government edicts
doctrine, promoted the principle that people need to know and have access to
the law. The Court’s decision, however, did not address all issues regarding which
works this principle covers. The Court’s test, while offering clarity, also narrows
the coverage of the doctrine. The test focuses on officials who are “empowered
to speak with the force of law” and the works that these officials produce in the
course of their official duties. 140 In its opinion, the Court distinguished the work
of these officials from the work “created by government officials (or private parties)
who lack authority to make or interpret the law.”141
Falling outside the government edicts doctrine are head notes and
other materials that private publishers create and include in their compilations of
court opinions and statutes.142 Some works, however, fall within a grey area.
These works are created by private parties, but officials have adopted or
incorporated these materials into legislative or regulatory works.143 Standing
GA. CODE ANN. § 1-1-1.
GA. CODE ANN. § 28-9-3.
140 GA v. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1503.
141 Id. at 1507 (emphasis added). A private party was involved in drafting the annotations for
the Georgia Code in the GA v. PRO case, but the court found that due to the work-for-hire
arrangement, the Georgia Code Commission was the author of the O.C.G.A. Id. at 1508.
142 See, e.g., W. Publ’g Co. v. Lawyers’ Coop. Publ’g Co., 79 F. 756 (2d Cir. 1897) (upholding
West Publishing’s copyright in headnotes and an injunction against Lawyers’ Cooperative for
infringement); see also Street & Hansen, supra note 136, at 223 (noting West Publishing’s claims
of copyright).
143 Am. Soc'y for Testing & Materials, et al. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 440
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
138
139
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alone, the original works can qualify for copyright. With the action of
government officials, the text may become part of the law depending on how it
is incorporated. Does this adoption into law mean that those parts of the original
works that were adopted are now “free for all” and no longer protected under
copyright? Private parties are the creators and copyright holders of these works,
unlike many nineteenth century publishers who claimed copyright through their
appointments and contracts with the state. Should the interests of these private
parties prevail over the need for public access? What if the private copyright
holders provide some access to the adopted works?
This section examines three types of works that the Supreme Court’s test in
GA v. PRO does not cover. These works are: privately created works referenced
in the law but that do not have the force of law (Section III.A); privately created
standards incorporated or adopted into law (Section III.B); and privately created
model codes incorporated or adopted into law (Section III.C). For each type of
work there is a discussion of whether there are other ways besides the
government edicts doctrine to include the works under the umbrella of the
principle that people need to know and access the law.
Cases discussed in this section often involve “incorporation” or
“incorporation by reference” of copyrighted works. By using incorporation by
reference, a government entity provides a reference in a statute, code, or
regulation to a separate work. The reference makes that work part of the statute,
code or regulation without including the actual text of the work.144
A. WORKS REFERENCED IN THE LAW BUT NOT HAVING THE FORCE OF LAW

There is limited case law addressing the copyright status of works that do not
have the force of law although they are referenced in the law. In the cases that
address this situation, state laws referred to the works to assist people with
making valuations or determinations. These references, however, did not involve
the adoption of the text of the works as law. The courts in these cases upheld
copyright protection for the works and allowed the copyright holder to control
use of the work despite the references in state or local law.
In 1994, the Second Circuit briefly addressed the effect of incorporation by
reference in CCC Information Services v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc. (CCC).145
In this case, the court rejected CCC’s argument that Maclean’s publication was
See Incorporation By Reference, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining
incorporation by reference). Incorporation by reference is a regular practice in the
development of federal regulations. See Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an OpenGovernment Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 133 (2013) (“[I]ncorporation by reference is
a term of art for the practice of codifying material published elsewhere by simply referring to
it in the text of a regulation.”).
145 CCC Info. Servs. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reps., Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994). CCC
posted in its computer database and republished and sold Maclean’s copyrighted publication.
Id. at 64.
144
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in the public domain because several state insurance statutes or regulations
referenced the values in the publication.146 The court expressed the concern that
many copyrighted works, such as school textbooks, were referenced in state
statutes and regulations.147 CCC’s approach would potentially mean those works
would lose protection, which the court did not view as supportable.148 A few
years later, the Ninth Circuit in Practice Management Information Corp. v. American
Medical Association (Practice Management) held that the American Medical
Association’s medical procedure coding system did not lose copyright protection
because federal regulations referenced it.149
In another case, County of Suffolk v. First American Real Estate Solutions (County
of Suffolk), the Second Circuit held that tax maps the county created under state
law could be copyrighted and were not in the public domain.150 The maps were
“referenced” in the law since under a state statute the county was required to
create the maps and assessors were required to use the maps for creating the
assessment rolls.151 One notable difference in this case from the other
incorporation by reference cases is that it involved a government entity as the
creator of the referenced work rather than a private party. The court used a twopart test to determine whether the maps were in the public domain: (1) did the
entity creating the work need an incentive to create the work and (2) did the
public need notice of the work.152 The court determined that the tax maps
created no “legal obligation.” The maps were just a means to provide assessment
under the statute and therefore adequate notice came through the statute itself.153

Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
148 Id. (“We are not prepared to hold that a state's reference to a copyrighted work as a legal
standard for valuation results in loss of the copyright.”).
149 Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997). The court
determined that the creators of the code were not salaried public officials like the judges in
Banks v. Manchester who did not need an incentive to create the work. Id. at 518. Finding this
referenced work to be in the public domain could diminish incentives for creation of many
types of works referenced in statutes and regulations. Id. at 519. The court acknowledged the
need for access to the law but found that there was not a limitation on access in this case. Id.
at 519 n.7. The court, however, limited AMA’s control over its work by holding that AMA
misused its copyright. Id. at 520. The misuse was prohibiting a federal administrative
organization from using competing codes. Id. at 520-21. See Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing
Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 501 (2003) (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
“limited the ability of the AMA to enforce its copyright” in its code).
150 County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Est. Sols., 261 F.3d 179, 195 (2d Cir. 2001). The
defendant argued that the maps were like judicial opinions and statutes. Id. at 193.
151 See id. at 184 (identifying the requirements for making and using maps); N.Y. REAL PROP.
TAX LAW § 503(1)(a) (Consol. 2021).
152 County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 194-95.
153 Id. at 195 (finding no evidence that people obligated to pay taxes lacked access to the maps).
146
147
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The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the county needed
additional incentives to create the maps.154
B. STANDARDS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

Privately created standards are works that that do not fall within the Supreme
Court’s test for inclusion under the government edicts doctrine. An array of nongovernmental organizations, mainly private, produce standards.155 These
organizations are standards development organizations or “SDOs.” Standards
provide technical definitions, recommended practices, methods of testing,
classifications, and specifications for a widely diverse range of products and work
in multiple industries.156 In the broadest sense, these standards “concern virtually
every aspect of modern society.”157
While SDO-produced standards are “voluntary,” they can become
“mandatory” when they are adopted or incorporated by reference in laws and
regulations.158 The partnership between government and SDOs produces
numerous public benefits.159 Recognizing the benefits, the Federal government
requires federal agencies to use SDO-produced standards rather than
government-unique standards.160
Id. at 194 (noting that “[m]any works of government . . . due to their expense, may require
additional incentives in order to justify their creation”).
155 See ROSS E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORS 23-25 (1990) (describing various types of organizations that set standards);
MAUREEN A. BREITENBERG, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, THE
ABCS
OF
STANDARDS
ACTIVITIES
11-13
(2009),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/IR/nistir7614.pdf (describing standard-creating
organizations).
156 See Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory
Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (1978) (describing types
of standards); see also Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d
437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Technical standards are as diverse as they are many . . . .”).
157 Hamilton, supra note 156, at 1331. See generally id. at 1368-73 (discussing the history and
expansion of the development and use of standards).
158 See Hamilton, supra note 156, at 1331 n.1 (discussing the use of the term “voluntary” when
applied to standards). All levels of government adopt and incorporate standards. See Peter L.
Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 502
(2013) (noting that the local, state, and federal levels of government use SDO-produced
standards).
159 Bremer, supra note 144, at 140-41. But see CHEIT, supra note 155, at 10 (discussing
disadvantages of relying on SDOs for developing standards).
160 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, §
12(d), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (1996) [hereinafter NTTAA]; OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF.
OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119, FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY
ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8554 (Feb. 19, 1998) [hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR
154
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Any government “substantive rules of general applicability” must be
published in the Federal Register.161 Material that is “reasonably available to the
class of persons affected thereby” must meet two conditions to be deemed
published in the Federal Register.162 The material must be “incorporated by
reference therein” and must have “the approval of the Director of the Federal
Register.”163 Materials published through incorporation by reference have the
force of law as explained on the Federal Register website:
Incorporation by reference is used primarily to make privately
developed technical standards Federally enforceable . . . . The
legal effect of incorporation by reference is that the material is
treated as if it were published in the Federal Register and CFR.
This material, like any other properly issued rule, has the force
and effect of law.164
Since the incorporated standards have the “force and effect of law,”165 failure
to follow the standards could expose people to sanctions.166 Despite this legal
effect, “private actors generate, control, and limit access to [these standards].”167

A-119] (defining “government-unique standards” as those “which are developed by the
government for its own uses”).
161 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D). If a matter is required to be published in the Federal Register and
it is not, it cannot affect an individual if they do not have notice. Id. at § 552(a)(1).
162 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
163 Id. The use of incorporation by reference supports the use of SDO-produced standards
while not substantially increasing the size of the Federal Register and Code of Federal
Regulations. See Strauss, supra note 158, at 502–03 ("[T]he conversion of standards into legal
obligations through incoporation by reference had its origin primarly in a wish to protect the
utility of the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations . . . ."); Nina A. Mendelson,
Private Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112
MICH. L. REV. 737, 742–43 (2014) (noting the idea behind the exception to Federal Reigter
publication was to allow agencies to incorporate material published elsewhere rather than
publish it in the Federal Register).
164
Code of Federal Regulations Incorporated by Reference, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html#why (last visited January
7, 2022). See OFF. OF THE FED. REG., IBR HANDBOOK 1 (2018),
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/write/handbook/ibr.pdf (“The legal effect
of IBR [incorporation by reference] is that the referenced material is treated as if it were
published in the Federal Register and the CFR. When IBRed, this material has the force and
effect of law, just like all regulations published in the Federal Register and the CFR.”).
165 Code of Federal Regulations Incorporated by Reference, supra note 164.
166 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case
of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (2005).
167 Id.
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Yet, non-governmental SDOs are not subject to due process requirements
concerning public access.168
1. American Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.
In 2017, a federal district court held that privately created standards did not
lose copyright protection upon incorporation into federal regulations.169 The
District Court for the District of Columbia addressed the complaint of several
SDOs that brought suit against Public.Resource.Org (PRO) for unauthorized
copying and posting of the plaintiffs’ standards.170 PRO argued that the plaintiffs’
standards were in the public domain because they were incorporated into law.171
The court recognized the public needs that were involved, but rejected PRO’s
arguments, stating that current Federal law already provided for access.172 In the
court’s view, PRO was asking for greater access,173 and it was up to Congress to
address that need.174 The district court distinguished cases involving government
works by noting that those cases applied to works by government authors and

See Shubha Ghosh, Copyright as Privatization: The Case of Model Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 653,
686 (2004) (“[T]he private drafting organization is not the state for due process purposes and
is therefore absolved.”).
169 Am. Soc'y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., Nos. 13-cv-01215 & 14cv-00857, 2017 WL 473822, at *14 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 ASTM]. This
district court decision directly addresses incorporation of standards that have the force of law.
As discussed infra, on appeal the circuit court addressed only fair use. See infra text accompanying
notes 181-183 (discussing the circuit court’s decision to limit its focus). The decisions in CCC,
Practice Management, and County of Suffolk involved incorporation of or references to works that
had not been adopted as “the law.” The district court decision, therefore, stands as the current
interpretation of the copyright status of standards that have been incorporated into law.
170 2017 ASTM, 2017 WL 473822, at *4. The district court addressed two cases in one opinion.
The plaintiffs from the second case, however, voluntarily dismissed their claim in October
2020. Stipulation and Order of Voluntary Dismissal, Am. Soc'y for Testing & Materials v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., No. 14-cv-0857 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2020), Doc. No. 149.
171 2017 ASTM, 2017 WL 473822, at *9.
172 Id. at *11 (referencing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) and 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a)(3), which both provide
that works incorporated by reference must be “reasonably available”).
173 Id. at *14. The district court stated that “there is no evidence that the [plaintiffs’] standards
are unavailable to the public.” Id. at *11. As evidence of availability, the court noted that federal
regulations required that the incorporated standards be available “in physical form” in the
Office of the Federal Register; they were available for purchase from the plaintiffs; and they
were “accessible in read-only format for free in . . . Plaintiffs’ online reading rooms.” Id. at
*11. The court viewed these means of access as meeting availability requirements, and so PRO
was asking for “greater access.” Id. at *11.
174 Id. at *11, *14 (“The ability to know, understand, and communicate the law as a broad
concept is of paramount importance to the continued success of our democracy. However,
changes . . . that reconsider the balancing of interests underlying modern copyright law and
incorporation by reference must be made by Congress, not this court.”).
168
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not private parties.175 The court also viewed cases involving model building
codes as not applicable.176
PRO also argued that the fair use doctrine protected its copying and posting
of the plaintiffs’ standards.177 The district court rejected this argument after an
analysis of the four fair use factors.178 The court stated that: “[T]here is nothing
in the Copyright Act or in court precedent to suggest that distribution of identical
copies of copyrighted works for the direct purpose of undermining Plaintiffs’
ability to raise revenue can ever be a fair use.”179
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia reversed the District Court’s
opinion in American Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (ASTM
v. PRO), and remanded the case.180 In reaching this decision, the Circuit Court
only focused on PRO’s fair use defense and chose not to address whether
standards retain copyright after incorporation by reference into law.181 The court
recognized that there is a spectrum of incorporated standards that ranges from
those that “impose legally binding requirements” to those that “serve as mere
references but have no direct legal effect.”182 This wide variation created
difficulties in determining which standards are actually “the law.”183 This
conclusion led to the court’s sole focus on PRO’s fair use defense.
The circuit court noted two problems with the district court’s review. First,
the district court took an “undifferentiated view of the incorporated
standards.”184 Second, in its review of PRO’s fair use claim, the district court also
“failed to account for the variation among the standards at issue and afford due
consideration to the particular legal status of each incorporated work.”185 The circuit
court directed the district court on remand “to develop a fuller record regarding
. . . each of the standards.”186
Id. at *10.
See id. at *13 (distinguishing Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir.
2002)).
177 2017 ASTM, 2017 WL 473822, at *15.
178 Id. at *15-18.
179 Id. at *18.
180 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 458 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
181 Id. at 441, 447.
182 Id. at 424-43.
183 Id. at 447 (discussing that by focusing only on fair use, the court did not need to determine
what happened under various scenarios when incorporated standards are no longer “the law”
or are only partially incorporated. The use of fair use would also restrict economic effects “by
allowing copying only where it serves a public end rather than permitting competitors to
merely sell duplicates at a lower cost.”).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 447-48 (emphasis added).
186 Id. at 449.
175
176
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The circuit court proceeded to review the four fair use factors under Section
107 of the Copyright Act187 and provide advice regarding the analysis needed on
remand.188 Of note, when discussing the first three fair use factors, the court
stated that it would heavily consider whether a particular incorporated standard
imposes binding legal obligations.189 A further discussion of the circuit court’s
analysis follows a summary of the court’s review of the four fair use factors.190
In reviewing the first factor, “the purpose and character of the use,”191 the
court determined there was little to indicate that PRO profited from the
reproduction of the standards or that PRO’s use was in any way commercial.192
It also determined that “distributing copies of the law for purposes of facilitating
public access could constitute transformative use.”193 The court distinguished
how the variations in standards could affect whether PRO’s actions were
transformative.194 The context for this discussion was the court’s recognition that
a use can be transformative in purpose without any change in the original
work.195 The circuit court linked the determination of the first factor with the
third factor concerning the amount of the work used.196 Depending on the nature

17 U.S.C. § 107.
ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 448-54.
189 See infra notes 191-199 (discussing the court’s analysis of the first factor), 200-208
(discussing the court’s analysis of the second factor), and 209-216 (discussing the court’s
analysis of the third factor).
190 See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing the court’s analysis in ASTM v. PRO).
191 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (“[T]he purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”).
192 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 448-49 (rejecting the district court summation that PRO’s
copying and distribution of the standards was “for the direct purpose of undermining [the
SDOs] ability to raise revenue”) (quoting ASTM v.PRO, 2017 WL 473822, at *18).
193 Id. at 450.
194 Id. The court uses examples of some of the incorporated standards to illustrate the
differences. The court reiterated the district court’s need to review on remand each standard
and use for a final determination. Id. at 451.
195 Id. at 450. For a discussion of courts’ determinations that a use is transformative based on
different purpose, see R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 485 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 747 (2011); Michael D. Murray, What Is Transformative? An
Explanatory Synthesis of the Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair
Use Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260, 261 (2012); D.R. Jones, Law Firm Copying and
Fair Use: An Examination of Different Purpose and Fair Use Markets, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 313, 32428 (2014).
196 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 452 (noting the Supreme Court’s analysis that “the extent of
permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use.” (quoting Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994)).
187
188
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of the incorporated standard, PRO would need to post the exact language.197 If
the standard provided legal obligations, it would be important to inform the
public of their obligations and to reproduce the exact language rather than
provide a summary.198 If a standard is not binding, however, then providing the
standard is only informative and PRO’s actions were less likely to be
transformative.199
The court’s discussion of the second factor, “the nature of the copyrighted
work,”200 was interesting in that the court referred to PRO’s argument that the
standards had become part of the law. The court initially noted that the standards
were factual and thus the second factor would weigh in PRO’s favor.201 This is
the usual analysis for the second factor, which focuses on the nature of the
work.202
The court went further, however, to note the incorporation by reference of
these standards into law. Since the standards were expressly part of the law, they
no longer had copyright protection.203 The court explained that the district court
viewed the incorporated standards as “technical” standards that “are vital to the
advancement of scientific progress” and therefore the district court held that
these “expressive” works were entitled to full copyright protection.204 The circuit
court disagreed with this characterization: “Were these ordinary technical
standards used for no public purpose, the district court might well be correct.
But the standards at issue here have all, in some capacity, been incorporated by
reference into law . . . .”205
The court quoted from cases that held that “the law” was not
copyrightable.206 In the court’s view, the incorporated standards were “at best, at

Id. at 450-52. See infra text accompanying notes 212-214 (discussing the court’s directions
to the district court regarding the third factor).
198 Id. at 450.
199 Id. The court reiterated the district court’s need to review on remand each standard and use
for a final determination. Id. at 451.
200 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (“[T]he the nature of the copyrighted work.”).
201 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 451.
202 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“The law
generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or
fantasy.”); Robert Kasunic, Is That All There Is? Reflections on the Nature of the Second Fair Use
Factor, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 529, 529 (2008) (“Despite the confusion surrounding its sister
factors, courts address [the second] factor with remarkable efficiency and frugality.”).
203 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 451.
204 Id. (quoting Am. Soc'y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 13-CV1215, 2017 WL 473822 at *17 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017)).
205 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 451.
206 Id. (referencing Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) and Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129
(6th Cir. 1898)).
197

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

33

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

34

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:1

the outer edge of ‘copyright’s protective purposes.’”207 The court concluded its
discussion of the second factor by noting that the amount of weight given to the
second factor will depend on whether “the consequence of the incorporation by
reference is virtually indistinguishable from a situation in which the standard had
been expressly copied into law.”208
In discussing the third factor, the “amount and substantiality of the portion
used,”209 the court noted that “precision is ten-tenths of the law.” 210 If PRO
were to limit its copying to “only what is required to fairly describe the standard’s
legal import,” then this factor would weigh in PRO’s favor.211 The court directed
that on remand a determination of the “amount and substantiality of the portion”
of the standards that PRO used should focus on what was necessary to convey
a specific standard.212 If the standard imparted a legal obligation, then PRO
would need to communicate the precise language.213 If the standard did not
govern conduct, PRO might be able to just paraphrase.214 This direction to the
district court is very closely tied to the court’s discussion of the first and second
factors and a determination of the nature of an individual incorporated
standard.215 This connection suggests that if an incorporated standard “provides
information essential to comprehending one’s legal duties,”216 then PRO’s
copying and posting of the entire standard would meet the first three factors.
The fourth factor focuses on the “effect of the use upon the potential
market.”217 Considering this factor, the court determined that PRO’s use of the
standards was not commercial and there was no inferred harm to the market.218
The district court, however, needed to further develop the record concerning

ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 451 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 586 (1994)).
208 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 452.
209 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (“[T]he amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole.”).
210 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 452.
211 Id. at 452.
212 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)) (noting that the district court did not engage in this detailed
analysis of the individual standards).
213 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 452.
214 Id. (providing an example of the difference between using precise language and
paraphrasing).
215 See supra text accompanying notes 191-208 (discussing the court’s analysis of the first and
second factors); see also infra Section III.B.2 (discussing the court’s overall analysis).
216 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 450.
217 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”).
218 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 452-53.
207
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possible adverse market impact.219 The court raised several questions to address
the substantiality of any impact.220
After reviewing the factors, the court determined that “there [was] reason to
believe ‘as a matter of law’” that PRO’s copying qualified as fair use, but it was
going to remand the case.221 The court remanded the decision for the district
court to further review under fair use PRO’s posting of the copied standards.222
2. ASTM v. PRO: Review.
In its fair use analysis, the circuit court focused heavily on a determination of
what constitutes the law.223 Since “the law” does not have copyright protection,
this determination is important. The circuit court’s review of the four fair use
factors does not start with the second factor but it could.224 The court’s
discussion under the second factor provides the base on which the court’s first
and third factor analysis builds. After the typical “fact versus fiction” second
factor determination, the court proceeds to look closer at the incorporated
standards. It emphasizes that these incorporated standards are more than just
“technical”: “They “have all, in some capacity, been incorporated by reference into law
. . . .”225 The identification of these standards as part of “the law,” triggers the
court’s observation that “the express text of the law falls plainly outside the realm of
copyright protection.”226 If the standards are law, this changes the analysis of the
Id. at 453.
Id. The questions focused on (1) If the plaintiffs, as they admitted, provided free copies,
what was the additional harm of PRO’s postings?; (2) Was there a market for the entire
standards if PRO only posted incorporated portions?; and (3) If PRO posted outdated
standards, did that harm “the market for updated, unincorporated editions?” Id. With regard
to the last question, the court noted the SDOs claimed their “primary purpose” for developing
standards was “‘to have them used by private industry and other non-governmental users.’”
Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee at 4). This suggested that there still could be a market for the
most current standards. The court also noted that the plaintiffs might still have incentives to
create the standards by making money on derivatives. As an example, the court referenced a
model code organization that remained profitable even after an adverse decision regarding
copyright in a model code. Id.
221 Id. at 448.
222 Id. at 449.
223 See id. at 459 (Katsas, J., concurring) (identifying the undercurrent in the circuit court’s
decision: “The Court's fair-use analysis faithfully recites the governing four-factor balancing
test, yet, in conducting the balancing, it puts a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of an unrestrained ability to
say what the law is.”) (emphasis added).
224 For comparison, see Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1201 (2021) in which
the Supreme Court started its fair use analysis with the second factor.
225 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 451 (emphasis added).
226 Id. (referencing Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888)); see also ASTM v. PRO, 896
F.3d at 459 (Katsas, J., concurring) (noting that the court “explicitly invokes” Banks v.
Manchester in this discussion).
219
220
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amount of protection they should receive and will affect whether to favor fair
use. The court summarizes the difference:

Where the consequence of the incorporation by reference is
virtually indistinguishable from a situation in which the
standard had been expressly copied into law, [the second]
factor weighs heavily in favor of fair use. But where the
incorporation does not lend to such easy substitution, fair use
is harder to justify.227
The circuit court remanded the case to the district court to determine “the
particular legal status of each incorporated work”228 or essentially whether a
standard is “the law.” In the court’s analysis of fair use, the determination of the
nature of each incorporated standard is critical for assessing fair use under the
first and third factors. The court’s analysis of the first three factors is intertwined.
If PRO copies and posts incorporated standards that are binding legal
obligations, then PRO needs to post the exact language.229 Conversely, “where
knowing the content of an incorporated standard might help inform one's
understanding of the law but is not essential to complying with any legal duty, the nature
of PRO's use might be less transformative and its wholesale copying, in turn, less
justified.”230
Although the court’s analysis is under fair use, its result is similar to the result
under infringement analysis. The court expressed the difficulty in determining
what actually constitutes “the law” if it had reviewed PRO’s public domain claim.
The fair use analysis the court proposes, however, requires a determination of
exactly which standards are “the law.” Posting online the exact language of
incorporated standards is posting “law.” It evokes the same analysis the Fifth
Id. at 452.
Id. at 448.
229 See id. at 450, 452 (noting that “precision is ten-tenths of the law.”). There are cases finding
fair use when a defendant copied the entire work. See, e.g., Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v.
Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 84-90 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News
Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000). The need to provide the public with the exact language
of the law so that they will know their obligations evokes the “merger doctrine” argument.
This argument contends that the text of the work and the law are the same and thus the exact
language has to be used to convey the law. The merger doctrine provides that “when there is
essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and
copyright is no bar to copying that expression.” Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 707–08 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
230 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 450. The circuit court quoted the Supreme Court regarding
third factor analysis: “[T]he relevant inquiry [is] whether ‘the amount and substantiality of the
portion used[’] . . . are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying." Id. at 452 (quoting
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994)) (emphasis added).
227
228
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Circuit used in an infringement case involving the posting online of model codes
that were the same text as the adopted law.231
The circuit court provided limited analysis of the fourth factor due to
unanswered questions and a need for a more developed record.232 A
determination that certain posted incorporated standards impose legal
obligations heightens the public benefit aspect of PRO’s actions. PRO is doing
more than providing information and education; it is facilitating access to the
law. As Judge Gregory Katsas summarizes his view of the court’s analysis:
“[W]here a particular standard is incorporated as a binding legal obligation, and
where the defendant has done nothing more than disseminate it, the Court leaves
little doubt that the dissemination amounts to fair use.”233 This summary does
not mention the fourth factor but suggests that if an incorporated standard is fair
use under the court’s entwined analysis of the first three factors, then fair use will
prevail.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision on fair use in Google LLC v. Oracle
America, Inc.234 offers further analysis of the fourth factor. The Court states that
when considering the effect on the market for the copyright holder’s work, a
court should “take into account the public benefits the copying will likely
produce.”235 The circuit court in ASTM v. PRO focuses on determining whether
standards are “the law,” which then raises the concerns for public needs of
knowledge and access. For this analysis, the circuit court relies on cases under
the government edicts doctrine which uphold the public’s need for knowledge
of and access to the law over copyright interests. This support of public needs
through dissemination and access to “the law” should also then be a
consideration in determining the weight given to the fourth factor.
C. MODEL CODES

Model codes are other works that do not fall within the Supreme Court’s test
for inclusion under the government edicts doctrine because they are the work of
private parties.236 Code drafting organizations are private entities that create
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 2002), discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 254-271. In the Veeck case, the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant did not infringe the plaintiff’s model codes when he copied and reprinted “only ‘the
law’” of the municipalities that adopted the model codes. Id. at 800.
232 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 453.
233 Id. at 459 (Katsas, J., concurring).
234 Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S.Ct. 1183, 1183 (2021).
235 Id. at 1206. The court cites for comparison the case of MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180,
183 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[W]here a claim of fair use is made, a balance must sometimes be struck
between the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted and the personal gain the
copyright owner will receive if the use is denied.”).
236 See supra discussion accompanying note 141 (noting that the decision in GA v. PRO limited
the application of the government edits doctrine).
231
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model codes such as building codes to provide uniform guidelines in various
industries. These organizations claim copyright in the codes they develop,
arguing that they receive revenues from sales of the codes.237 A code drafting
organization creates a model building code to promote uniform health and safety
guidance relating to the construction of houses and other types of buildings.238
These organizations promote the codes they create for adoption by government
entities.239 Government entities that lack expert resources can adopt a code
produced by those with technical expertise.240 Governments can adopt the model
code directly into law, either entirely or with amendments.241 They can also
incorporate the model code by reference, thus making the code part of the law.

See, e.g., The Importance of Copyright Protection, INT’L CODE COUNCIL,
https://www.iccsafe.org/about/news-and-events/copyright-protection/ (last visited January
7, 2022) (discussing the need for copyright in model codes). But see, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code
Cong. Int'l., Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 805-06 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing how model code
organizations have other incentives besides copyright and other ways to earn revenue); Lydia
Pallas Loren, The Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation to
Shape Copyright Protection, 69 La. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2008) (discussing other motivations for creating
model codes); Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright §2.5.2.1, p. 2:59 (3rd ed. 2021) (“[I]t is
difficult to imagine an area of creative endeavor in which the copyright incentive is needed
less. Trade organizations have powerful reasons stemming from industry standardization,
quality control and self-regulation to produce these codes; it is unlikely that without copyright
they will cease producing them.”).
238 ALAN JEFFERIS ET AL., ARCHITECTURAL DRAFTING AND DESIGN at 155 (6th ed. 2011)
(explaining that building codes “regulate issues related to fire, structural ability, health, security,
and energy conservation”). In 1994, three regional code drafting organizations, which had
previously drafted and promoted their own codes, formed the International Code Council
(ICC). NELSON & ASSOC., SAY “GOODBYE” TO THE STANDARD BUILDING CODE (SBC),
UNIFORM BUILDING CODE (UBC), AND THE BOCA NATIONAL BUILDING CODE SAY
“HELLO” TO THE INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CODE (IBC) 1-3 (2002),
http://www.hazardcontrol.com/factsheets/pdfs/say-goodbye-to-SBC-UBC-BOCA.pdf. See
also David Listokin & David B. Hattis, Building Codes and Housing, 8 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POL’Y
DEV.
&
RSCH.
27,
29
(2005),
https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/cityscpe/vol8num1/ch2.pdf [hereinafter Listokin &
Hattis] (describing the creation of the ICC); Michael D. Turner, Paradigms, Pigeonholes, and
Precedent: Reflections on Regulatory Control of Residential Construction, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 28
(2001) (discussing different model code organizations).
239 See, e.g., INT’L CODE COUNCIL, 2019 INTERNATIONAL CODE COUNCIL YEAR IN REVIEW 20,
https://www.iccsafe.org/wp-content/uploads/annual-report-2019.pdf (noting that ICC has
a government relations national strategy to “[a]dvocate for the adoption of codes by the federal
government, states, and localities”). by the fed
240 See Listokin & Hattis, supra note 238, at 23 (discussing why governments do not develop
their own codes); Int’l Code Council v. UpCodes, No. 17 CIV. 6261 (VM), 2020 WL 2750636,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020)(noting that developers of model codes are more familiar with
the subject area than governments).
241 Listokin & Hattis, supra note 238, at 23.
237
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Once adopted into law, these codes are enforceable with significant
consequences for failure to comply.242
1. Model Code Cases
The First Circuit in Building Officials & Code Administrators v. Code Technology,
Inc. (BOCA) considered whether a model building code adopted as the law had
become part of the public domain.243 The plaintiff, Building Officials & Code
Administrators, sued the defendant for copyright when the defendant published
its edition of the Massachusetts building code.244 The defendant based its edition
on BOCA’s model code.245 The defendant argued that the model code had
become part of the law, and thus, like judicial opinions and statutes, was in the
public domain.246 The plaintiff countered that a private organization, rather than
public officials, drafted the code.247
After reviewing historical case law, the First Circuit concluded that “the
citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who actually
drafts the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent of the
public, expressed through the democratic process.”248 The First Circuit then
noted that Massachusetts regulations “have the effect of law” including
sanctions.249 Due process required that the public have notice of these legal
obligations.250 The court stated that “if access to the law is limited, then the
people will or may be unable to learn of its requirements and may be thereby
deprived of the notice to which due process entitles them.”251
The court acknowledged the defendant’s argument that “the holder of a
copyright has the right to refuse to publish the copyrighted material at all and
may prevent anyone else from doing so, thereby preventing any public access to
the material.”252 The court did not see how to reconcile this right with the

Rick Roos, Building Codes and Standards 101, ROCKWOOL (June 26, 2019),
https://www.rockwool.com/north-america/advice-and-inspiration/blog/building-codesand-standards/ (“Those who fail to meet code requirements . . . may be ordered to make
necessary repairs, cease construction activity, have their building permit revoked, be required
to demolish all or some portions of the work, face fines or have other consequences levied.”).
243 Bldg. Offs. & Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 1980).
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 733.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
249 Id. at 734.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 735.
242
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public’s need to access to the law, but it remanded the case to allow the plaintiff
further opportunity to argue its position.253
At the time the First Circuit considered the status of a model code adopted
into law, there were no other decisions that directly addressed the matter, and
the First Circuit did not provide a ruling. The first case to definitively address the
issue was the Fifth Circuit decision in Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress
International.254 In Veeck, two small Texas municipalities adopted the plaintiff’s
model building code as their own, incorporating the model code by reference.255
The defendant posted a copy of the plaintiff’s model code on his website as the
official code for these two municipalities.256 He filed for declaratory judgment
after the plaintiff model code organization objected to the posting.257
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, grounded its decision in its interpretation of
the cases underpinning the government edicts doctrine.258 To place this case
under the doctrine even though a government official did not create the work,
the court adopted the “metaphorical concept of citizen authorship” articulated
in BOCA.259 The court stated:
The very process of lawmaking demands and incorporates
contributions by ‘the people,’ in an infinite variety of individual
and organizational capacities. Even when a governmental body
consciously decides to enact proposed model building codes,
it does so based on various legislative considerations, the sum
of which produce its version of ‘the law.’ In performing their
function, the lawmakers represent the public will, and the
public are the final ‘authors’ of the law.260

Id. at 735-36. (“We are . . . far from persuaded that BOCA's virtual authorship of the
Massachusetts building code entitles it to enforce a copyright monopoly over when, where,
and how the Massachusetts building code is to be reproduced and made publicly available.”).
254 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002). For an extensive
discussion and analysis of the Veeck decision, see Ghosh, supra note 168, at 669-682; 690-698;
707-11; 716-21; 723-24.
255 Veeck, 293 F.3d at 793. The plaintiff was a private non-profit organization that developed
and promoted various model building codes which it encouraged government entities to
adopt. The plaintiff also sold copies of the codes for revenue. Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. The plaintiff counterclaimed for copyright infringement.
258 The court also found support for the defendant’s actions through an examination of the
Idea/Expression dichotomy and the merger doctrine. Id. at 800-02.
259 Id. (quoting BOCA, 628 F.2d at 734).
260 Id. at 799. The Fifth Circuit viewed the reference in Banks v. Manchester to judges’ salaries to
mean that the source of those salaries, “the public at large,” had the interest in the works. Id.
at 797.
253
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The Fifth Circuit held that “as law, the model codes enter the public domain
and are not subject to the copyright holder's exclusive prerogatives. As model
codes, however, the organization's works retain their protected status.”261 If the
defendant copied only “the law” which in this case was the same as the plaintiff’s
model code, then he did not infringe.262 The creators of the model codes still
retained copyright in those codes.263 Once a government entity adopted the
codes as “the law,” however, then anyone could copy or distribute the codes as
“the law” of those jurisdictions.”264
The court characterized the case as involving “the wholesale adoption of a
model code promoted by its author . . . precisely for use as legislation.”265 The
court suggested that the plaintiff in Veeck and similar entities had other
motivations beside copyright incentive to create and publish these codes.266 In
distinguishing CCC and Practice Management, the court found that the facts of
those cases were distinguishable because the government did not incorporate the
copyrighted works into law but rather referenced them for the public to
consult.267
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the plaintiff met public access
concerns, noting that there was not “a factual calculus concerning the ‘adequacy’
of public access to the law.”268 As the court stated:
We disagree that the question of public access can be limited
to the minimum availability that SBCCI would permit. . . .
Instead, public ownership of the law means precisely that ‘law’
is in the ‘public domain’ for whatever use the citizens choose
to make of it. . . . In our view, to say, as Banks does, that the
Id.
Veeck, 293 F.3d at 800. The court noted that the defendant would have infringed, however,
if he “had copied the model codes as model codes, or if he had indiscriminately mingled those
portions of ‘the law’ of [the municipalities] adopted by their town councils with other parts of
the model codes not so adopted.” Id. n.14.
263 Id. at 802.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 804. (distinguishing situations in which standards are incorporated by reference into
laws).
266 Id. at 805-06. The court rejected the argument that the lack of full protection for the model
codes would result in less revenue. It noted that there was no evidence of the effect of the
defendant’s posting on revenues, and that there were other ways for the plaintiffs and similar
entities to earn revenues. Id. at 806 and 806 n.21.
267 Id. at 804-05. The court also noted that the works in those cases “were created by private
groups for reasons other than incorporation into law. To the extent incentives are relevant to
the existence of copyright protection, the authors in these cases deserve incentives.” Id. The
court does not explain what happens when an organization has mixed incentives or the work
becomes part of the law even though the organization was not promoting its adoption.
268 Id. at 797.
261
262
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law is “free for publication to all” is to expand, not factually
limit, the extent of its availability.269
The plaintiff argued that any due process concerns “must be balanced against
its proprietary rights and that the fair use doctrine as well as its honorable
intentions [would] prevent abuse.”270 The court‘s response to this argument was
“Free availability of the law, by this logic, has degenerated into availability as long
as [the copyright holder] chooses not to file suit.”271
2. International Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes
In International Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc. (UpCodes),272 the United States
District Court, Southern District, New York addressed whether it was an
infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright to post copies of the plaintiff’s model
building codes that state and local had adopted. In a lengthy opinion, Judge
Victor Marrero concluded that the posted model building codes “are in the
public domain because they are in fact enacted state and local laws binding on
the enacting jurisdictions’ constituents.”273 In reaching his decision, Judge
Marrero repeatedly reaffirmed and upheld the principle that the people must
have knowledge of and access to the law. He emphasized that “a private party
cannot exercise its copyrights to restrict the public’s access to the law.”274
The International Code Council (ICC) is a non-profit organization that
develops widely adopted model building codes.275 ICC sued UpCodes for
copyright infringement of its published International Codes (I-Codes) which
UpCodes had copied and posted online without permission.276 UpCodes posted

Veeck, 293 F.3d at 799.
Id. at 799-800.
271 Id. at 800.
272 Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 17 CIV. 6261 (VM), 2020 WL 2750636, at
*4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020).
273 Id. at *6.
274 Id. at *7.
275
International
Codes
and
Standards,
INT’L
CODE
COUNCIL,
https://global.iccsafe.org/international-codes-and-standards/ (last visited January 7, 2022);
INT’L CODE COUNCIL, Driving Growth and Affordability Through Innovation and Safety 2,
https://cdn-web.iccsafe.org/wp-content/uploads/11-05391_ICC-TradeshowBrochure_Final1_lores.pdf [hereinafter ICC Brochure]. ICC was founded in 1994 by the
merger of the Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc. (BOCA), the
International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO), and the Southern Building Code
Congress International, Inc. (SBCCI). ICC Brochure at 2; Who We Are, INT’L CODE COUNCIL,
https://www.iccsafe.org/about/who-we-are/0/ (last visited January 7, 2022). A primary
reason that ICC develops the codes “is for governments to enact them as law.” UpCodes, 2020
WL 2750636, at *2.
276 Id. at *4.
269
270
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I-Codes that state and local governments had adopted and incorporated by
reference (I-Codes as Adopted) and redlined copies of unadopted text of I-Codes
(I-Codes Redlines).277 To address this situation, the primary precedents and
doctrines Judge Marrero considered were the government edicts doctrine; model
code cases, incorporation by reference cases; the merger doctrine; and the fair
use doctrine.
a. Guidance from the Government Edicts Doctrine
To determine if the I-Codes as Adopted were in the public domain, Judge
Marrero first considered application of the government edicts doctrine which the
Supreme Court had recently reaffirmed and clarified in GA v. PRO.278 UpCodes is
the first case to discuss and apply the decision in GA v. PRO in a case involving
the possible application of the government edicts doctrine.279 Judge Marrero
acknowledged that “[n]either the Supreme Court nor Congress has explicitly
addressed the public domain implications of government references to privatelyauthored copyrighted works.”280 He noted, however, that important principles
guided the Supreme Court’s analysis in government edicts cases.281 These
principles could be a basis for addressing the situation in UpCodes.282 This initial
reference to principles highlighted that Judge Marrero would ground his analysis
in the principle of unfettered access to the law that the Supreme Court and other
courts had identified. He repeatedly returns to this principle throughout the
opinion.
After a brief summary of the holdings in Wheaton, Banks and Callaghan,283
Judge Marrero discussed the GA v. PRO decision. He determined that under the
“author-focused” test the Court articulated in GA v. PRO, the I-Codes as
Adopted were not covered under the government edicts doctrine because ICC
was a private party.284 Although the government edicts doctrine did not apply

Id. The I-Codes Redlines were posted on an earlier version of the website. Id.
UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *7-*8.
279 See Catherine Shu, A Court Decision in Favor of Startup Upcodes May Help Shape Open Access to
the
Law,
TECHCRUNCH
(Nov.
16,
2020,
6:55AM
CST),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/11/16/a-court-decision-in-favor-of-startup-upcodes-mayhelp-shape-open-access-to-the-law/ (“[The UpCodes decision] is noteworthy because it is one
of the first to cite the Supreme Court’s ruling earlier this year in Georgia v. Public.Resource.org
. . . .”). The District Court, Southern District, New York decided UpCodes on May 27, 2020.
The Supreme Court decided GA v. PRO on April 27, 2020.
280 UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *7.
281 Id. Judge Marrero viewed the Court’s decision in GA v. PRO as clarifying these principles.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at *8. The test in GA v. PRO applied to works created by officials “vested with the
authority to make and interpret the law” but not to works created by private parties without
277
278
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to the work of private parties like ICC, Judge Marrero rejected ICC’s argument
that it could enforce its copyrights in full.285 He drew “significant guidance”
from the cases, particularly GA v. PRO, underpinning the government edicts
doctrine: “any rule in the case at hand must respect the public’s need for full and
unfettered access to the law.”286
b. Alternative Considerations – Applying Veeck
Significantly, Judge Marrero highlighted that “the author-focused Government
Edicts rule is but one way of effecting the principle that ‘no one can own the law.’”287 He
therefore turned to other precedent to evaluate the situation in UpCodes.288 This
consideration involved seeking guidance from cases that Judge Marrero viewed
as being “almost directly on point,” BOCA and Veeck,289 to determine whether
the copied works were “the law” and therefore in the public domain.
In BOCA and Veeck, the courts considered whether model codes adopted
into law were in the public domain.290 While these cases were factually very
similar to UpCodes, there was a reason that Judge Marrero could not rely directly
on the analysis in the cases. In BOCA and Veeck the courts viewed the works as
falling within the government edicts doctrine under the concept that the citizens
were actually the authors of the works.291
As Judge Marrero notes, this was the same approach that the Eleventh Circuit
took in its review of the GA v. PRO case.292 The Supreme Court in GA v. PRO
did not adopt the “citizen as author” view but instead held that officials cannot
be authors.293 So, Judge Marrero could not rely on these cases as government
this authority. Id. (quoting GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. at 1507). The test was “clearly not dispositive
in this case.” Id.
285 Id. at *8 n.6; see Letter to Honorable Victor Morrero from Counsel for International Code
Council at 2, UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636 (2020) (17 CIV. 6261 (VM)), Doc. No. 104 (arguing
that the I-Codes were not under the government edicts doctrine, even if a government adopted
them).
286 Id. at *8. Judge Marrero quoted the Supreme Court’s statement in GA v. PRO that “[t]he
animating principle behind [the Government Edicts rule] is that no one can own the law.” Id.
(quoting GA v. PRO at 1507). He also noted the Supreme Court’s concerns as to what could
happen if there could be copyright in all the works of government officials. Id. at *8 n.5.
287 UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *8 n.6 (emphasis added).
288 Id. at *8.
289 Id. at *9, *10.
290 Id. at *9. Both cases also involved predecessor organizations to ICC and some of ICC’s
codes were based on these predecessor codes. Id. For a discussion of these cases, see supra
Section C.1.
291 BOCA, 628 F.2d at 734; Veeck, 293 F.3d at 799.
292 Id. at *9.
293 GA v. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1506 (noting that the Court relied on different reasons for its
decision than the Eleventh Circuit).
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edicts doctrine cases. Instead, he focused on other rationale in these cases to
support a holding that the I-Codes as Adopted were in the public domain.
The I-Codes as Adopted were “literally state and local laws.”294 The Supreme
Court’s decision in GA v. PRO, however, focused on the author of the works,
rather than whether the copied works had the force of law.295 Since the
government edicts doctrine did not apply in the UpCodes case because ICC was
a private party, an alternative for the court was to establish that the I-Codes as
Adopted were “the law.”296 The focus shifted from the author of the work to
the copied work itself. As Judge Marrero noted, if the analysis stopped at
authorship and the author is a private individual or entity, that author could claim
copyright in any law they help draft.297 A determination that the copied work was
“the law” would invoke the need to protect the public’s need for knowledge of
and access to the law and therefore would support placing the works in the public
domain. In addition to reviewing BOCA and Veeck, Judge Marrero distinguished
the holdings in those cases from the holdings in CCC and Practice Management.298
The distinction was that BOCA and Veeck involved “the incorporation of
copyrighted codes into laws that directly regulate primary conduct” while CCC
and Practice Management involved “laws that reference copyrighted materials.”299
Having reviewed relevant cases and law, Judge Marrero stated that “the
principles that guide the Court’s analysis seem relatively clear. The law is in the
public domain, and the public must be afforded free access to it.”300 He noted
that simply because a law references a privately-authored work does not “make
that work ‘the law,’ such that the public needs free access to the work.”301
Privately-authored works, however, could “become ‘the law’ upon substantial
government adoption in limited circumstances.”302 He provided considerations

Id. at *8.
GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. 1498, 1513 (2020) (“Instead of examining whether given material
carries ‘the force of law,’ we ask only whether the author of the work is a judge or a legislator.”).
296 See UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636 at *8 n.6.
297 See id. (discussing whether private authors could claim copyright if they drafted ballot
initiatives or bills that became law).
298 Id. at *11. Judge Marrero also considered the Second Circuit decision in County of Suffolk.
He determined that while this case focused on works by government authors and was not
applicable to the UpCodes situation, it did offer some consideration for the weighing of due
process concerns because it weighed due process and an author’s economic incentives. See id.
at *12.
299 Id. at *11 (quoting Brief of Amicus for United States, Supporting Respondents at 8, Veeck,
537 v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791537 U.S. 1043 (2002) (No. 02-355),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2002/01/01/20020355.pet.ami.inv.pdf [hereinafter Solicitor General’s Brief]).
300 Id. at *16.
301 Id.
302 Id.
294
295
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or guideposts to determine when the due process need for notice would
“outweigh the private author’s need for economic incentives.”303
Judge Marrero reviewed the record in light of these considerations. He
concluded that UpCodes would not be liable for “accurate copying of the I-Codes
as Adopted.”304 Applying the holding in Veeck to UpCodes’ situation, if UpCodes
posted only “the law” then the works it posted are in the public domain although
they are the plaintiff’s model codes.305 This decision was based on the
functioning of the I-Codes as Adopted as law. If the I-Codes as Adopted were
the law, then due process requirements dictated that the public needed to know
of these “legally binding obligations.”306 Upcodes could post this binding
language. On the other hand, UpCodes could be liable for infringement if it
posted “the I-Codes as I-Codes,” i.e., model codes as model codes, or if it posted
the I-Code Redlines, which mixed portions of the enacted law with unadopted
model code text.307
The court also considered the need for economic incentives. Judge Marrero
stated that when works “constitute the law” then the weight must be in favor of
“the need for free public access.”308 Judge Marrero acknowledged that there was
a balance between due process needs and economic incentives. He stated
however, that “this Court is not persuaded that the need for economic incentives
could meaningfully weigh against the need for free public access to the law in
these circumstances.”309

Id. Judge Marrero noted that the considerations in the list were not all “strictly necessary or
exhaustive.” Id. The considerations were based on those in the Solicitor General’s Brief, supra
note 299, at 11. The discussion in the Brief focuses on how to distinguish the situation in
Veeck from that in CCC and Practice Management.
304 Id. at *17 (emphasis added). He denied UpCodes’ motion for partial summary judgment,
however, since there were factual issues as to whether UpCodes had “’indiscriminately
mingled’ enacted text with unadopted model text.” Id. at *18. It was “ambiguous whether
UpCodes posts only the law.” Id. at *19.
305 Id. at *10. The Fifth Circuit held that Veeck did not infringe the plaintiff’s copyrights when
he copied and posted “only ‘the law’” of the municipalities. The building codes that Veeck
copied and posted and the municipalities’ laws were one and the same. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code
Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 2002).
306 Id. at *17.
307 UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *10 (quoting Veeck, 293 F.3d at 800 n.14) (acknowledging
that ICC “retain[ed] its copyright in the I-Codes and related derivative works that do not
constitute the law.”).
308 Id. at *12, *13.
309 See id. at *12, *17 (“[T]he [c]ourt is not persuaded that ICC’s need for economic incentives
can outweigh the due process concerns at issue here, especially knowing that ICC will not stop
producing its model codes in the event of a contrary holding.”).
303
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c. Merger Doctrine
The court in UpCodes also discussed310 the merger doctrine.311 Citing
Second Circuit precedent, Judge Marrero agreed with UpCodes that the doctrine
would apply to works at the time of infringement, not at the time of the creation
of the work as ICC argued.312 The merger doctrine would protect copying a fully
adopted model code to express “the identically-worded law.”313 It would be
necessary to use the exact language of the model code to express the text of the
law.314
d. Fair Use
UpCodes argued that its copying of the I-Codes Redlines was fair use, and
their use of the I-Codes as Adopted was also fair use if the those codes were
not in the public domain.315 In analyzing UpCodes’ copying under the four fair
use factors, Judge Marrero considered not only Supreme Court and Second
Circuit precedent but also the D.C. Circuit decision in ASTM v. PRO which he
found to be “the most factually analogous guidance.”316
First Factor. Judge Marrero determined that the copying and posting of the
I-Codes as Adopted served a transformative purpose of disseminating “enacted
laws for public awareness.”317 He noted that the I-Codes as Adopted served a

Id. at *19.
Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–08 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The
doctrine's underlying principle is that ‘[w]hen there is essentially only one way to express an
idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable[,] and copyright is no bar to copying that
expression.’”).
312 UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *20. ICC relied on the Federal Circuit decision in Oracle
Am. Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that merger
analysis should focus on the time of creation of a work, not at the time of the infringement).
The Supreme Court in its review of the Federal Circuit decision did not address the merger
doctrine but opted to only consider the application of fair use. See Google LLC v. Oracle Am.,
Inc., 141 S.Ct. 1183, 1197 (2021) (discussing that the Court would only consider the fair use
claim).
313 UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *21.
314 Id. Given ambiguities in the record on the issue, Judge Marrero declined to conclude that
UpCodes was “clearly not expressing the idea of enacted laws” and denied ICC’s motion on
merger. Id.
315 Id. at *22.
316 Id. at *22-23. Judge Marrero noted that the D.C. Circuit described incorporated standards
on a spectrum ranging from those that defined legal obligations like “a local building code” to
those that had “no direct legal effect.” Id. (quoting Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 442-43 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added)).
317 Id. at *25 (noting that UpCodes’ claimed purpose was consistent with purposes listed in
Section 107, including “teaching, scholarship and research.”). Judge Marrero considered cases
in which the courts found that having a different purpose could be transformative even though
310
311

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

47

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

48

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:1

different purpose than the I-Codes that ICC drafted.318 ICC’s codes were
recommended models for government adoption.319 The I-Codes as Adopted,
however, were “actual regulations binding the public.”320 Posting to educate the
public about these “actual regulations” could be transformative, “even if the
enacted laws are identical to other copyrighted works.”321
Judge Marrero determined that under the first factor UpCodes could post
the I-Codes as Adopted in full to inform the public of their legal duties.322
Judge Marrero however could not find that copying and posting the I-Code
Redlines was fair use under the first factor.323
Second Factor. Judge Marrero found that model building codes were “in the
periphery of copyright protection.”324 They were also factual in nature.325 The
I-Codes as Adopted were the text of law, which does not have copyright
protection.326 He easily found that the second factor weighed in favor of fair
use as to the I-Codes as Adopted and the I-Codes Redlines.327
Third Factor. Judge Marrero noted that even though the copying of the ICodes as Adopted was “substantial,” that copying was “limited to exactly what
[was] contained in the enacted laws themselves.”328 Since “precision is tentenths of the law,” the third factor did “not weigh against a finding that
accurate copying of the I-Codes as Adopted is a fair use.”329 The third factor
did weigh against a finding of fair use as to the copying of the I-Codes Redlines
due to the extensive copying of unadopted portions of the codes. 330
Fourth Factor. Judge Marrero determined that the “impact of the fourth fair
use factor [was] ambiguous” due to factual disputes as to the effects of the

there was no alteration in the copied work, e.g., Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P.,
756 F.3d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 2014).
318 UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *25.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id. at *24.
322 Id. at *25 (referencing the D.C. Circuit Court’s discussion of the first factor in ASTM v.
PRO).
323 Id.
324 Id. at *26.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *26.
328 Id. at *27.
329 Id. (quoting Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437,
452 (D.C. Cir. 2018)).
330 Id.
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copying and posting of the I-Codes as Adopted and the I-Code Redlines.331 He
was skeptical that the fourth factor could be material enough to override the
combined weight of the other three factors in UpCodes’ favor as to the ICodes as Adopted.332 He also noted “the many grounds counseling that the ICodes as Adopted are in the public domain,”333 which suggested that there
might not be a need for fair use analysis for these postings.
Overall Assessment of Fair Use. Judge Marrero did not hold that the
copying of the I-Codes Redlines was a fair use as a matter of law. He denied
ICC’s motion for summary judgment, however, because there were disputes of
material facts.334 He determined that the “accurate posting of the I-Codes as
Adopted” was a fair use as a matter of law.335 He acknowledged that there were
factual disputes to resolve as to market harm, but “the potential harms to ICC’s
markets for its works cannot outweigh the benefits and necessity of enabling
unfettered access to enacted laws.”336
e. Summary of UpCodes.
In the UpCodes decision Judge Marrero reviewed all the relevant precedent
from the GA v. PRO decision on the government edicts doctrine through the
various adoption and incorporation cases including ASTM v. PRO and the model
code cases.337 He considered both public domain arguments and fair use.338
Through his thorough opinion, he demonstrated that there were other ways of
effecting the principle that “no one can own the law.”339
V. AFFIRMING THE PEOPLES’ NEED FOR KNOWLEDGE OF AND ACCESS TO
THE LAW: CONTINUING CHALLENGES
The Supreme Court’s decision in GA v. PRO affirmed the importance of
access to the law and clarified which works are in the public domain under the
government edicts doctrine.340 Justice Roberts in GA v. PRO opined that the

Id. at *28. Judge Marrero referenced the court’s observation in ASTM v. PRO that ICC had
remained profitable after its predecessor lost its claim in the Veeck case, “which might suggest
that ICC’s markets remain resilient despite the copying allowed in Veeck.” Id. at *27.
332 Id. There was a potential that the fourth factor could weigh against UpCodes if the I-Codes
as Adopted were effective substitutes for the model codes. Id. at *28.
333 UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *27.
334 Id. at *24.
335 Id.
336 Id. at *28.
337 Id. at *6-*13; *22-*28.
338 Id.
339 Id. at *8 n.6.
340 GA v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. 1493, 1507 (2020).
331
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Court’s reaffirmation and clarification of the government edicts doctrine offered
a “clear path forward” for future determinations of which government works fit
within the doctrine.341 That path is a narrow one, but the decisions in UpCodes
and ASTM v. PRO demonstrate that there are other ways to support access to
the law besides the government edicts doctrine. There are works that can still
find protection under the umbrella of the principle that people must have
knowledge of and access to the law even though those works do not fit under
the government edicts doctrine.
These three recent decisions continue a line of cases upholding the need and
the right of the people to know the law and the related, integral need to have
access to the law. This line of cases, upholding public needs over copyright
holder interests, spans three centuries.342 In the present time, however, there
remain continuing challenges to providing knowledge of and access to the law.
With regard to some works, it seems we are getting farther away from providing
needed knowledge and access.
This section recapitulates the three centuries of judicial support for public
access to the law over the proprietary rights of copyright holders. It also
highlights the deeply concerning continuing issues with standards incorporated
into law, including examples of how lack of access has affected court decisions.
It discusses the role of government and of non-government innovators in
enhancing access to the law while noting how copyright controls limit this
enhancement.
A. THREE CENTURIES OF AFFIRMING PUBLIC NEEDS OVER COPYRIGHT
HOLDER INTERESTS

Copyright holders have full control over works and can decide to limit or
deny access.343 The historical cases in which courts developed the government
edicts doctrine illustrate that a copyright holder can decide to limit or deny public
access to further its own interests in suppressing competition. In particular, in
two often-cited nineteenth century cases, Nash v. Lathrop and Banks v. Manchester,
“free availability of the law” meant “availability as long as [the copyright holder

Id. at 1513.
See infra Section IV.A (discussing court decisions from the nineteenth through the twentyfirst century).
343 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 130 (1932) (“Copyright is a right exercised by the
owner during the term at his pleasure and exclusively for his own profit . . . .”); see Patterson,
On Copyrighting Law, supra note 28, at 60 (“For copyright gives the copyright proprietor an
ownership of the copyrighted work so as to enable him to deal with the work as his private
property. The essence of property is the right to exclude others from its use . . . .”).
341
342
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chose] not to file suit.”344 A review of the facts of these cases shows the
aggressive actions of the publishers claiming copyright to control and limit access
in order to further their own interests. The courts in these cases as well as others
supported access to the law over copyright holder interests.345 These cases
continue to serve as a base for access to the law decisions.
Courts in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have continued to uphold
the principle of knowledge of and access to the law over the rights and interests
of copyright holders. Modern plaintiffs have acknowledged a public need for
access, but claim that they provide “adequate” access to meet this need.346 Courts
have questioned this argument, and many have rejected it.347 As noted for the
nineteenth century cases, “free availability of the law” means “availability as long
as [the copyright holder] chooses not to file suit.”348 This quote from Veeck
(2002) was the Fifth Circuit’s curt retort to the plaintiff model code
organization’s argument that “due process must be balanced against its
proprietary rights and . . . the fair use doctrine as well as its honorable intentions
will prevent abuse.”349 The plaintiff argued that meeting “due process” concerns
meant “nothing more than the factual issue of ‘sufficient’ public access.”350 Since
copies of the plaintiff’s code were “available for inspection and individual
copying in a public office” the plaintiff argued it met its obligations.351 The court
rejected this view, stating that:
We disagree that the question of public access can be limited
to the minimum availability that [plaintiff copyright holder]
would permit . . . . There is also no suggestion that
The quote is from a twenty-first century case, Veeck, 292 F.3d at 800, but aptly describes
the nineteenth century situation. Although the court in Nash did not decide the case under
copyright, it was the actions of a copyright holder that prompted the lawsuit.
345 See supra Section I for a discussion of the nineteenth century cases supporting public access,
including a discussion of the details of and holdings in Nash and Banks v. Manchester.
346 See, e.g., 2017 ASTM, 2017 WL 473822, at *4 (identifying how plaintiffs’ claimed they
provided access); Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 17 CIV. 6261 (VM), 2020
WL 2750636, at *13 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020)(noting ways plaintiff claimed it provided
adequate access); Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1247
n.2 (11th Cir. 2018)(noting how appellees claimed they provided adequate access); Veeck v. S.
Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 2002)(noting plaintiff’s argument that
it gave permission for copying).
347 See, e.g., Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d at 1247 n.2
(rejecting appellees’ access arguments); UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *13 n.11; Veeck, 293
F.3d at 799 (rejecting plaintiffs’ access arguments). But see, e.g., 2017 ASTM, 2017 WL 473822,
at *11 (agreeing that plaintiffs made their works reasonably available).
348 Veeck, 293 F.3d at 800.
349 Id. at 799-800.
350 Id. at 799.
351 Id.
344
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the Banks concept of free access to the law is a factual
determination or is limited to due process, as the term is
understood today. Instead, public ownership of the law means
precisely that “the law” is in the “‘public domain” for whatever
use the citizens choose to make of it . . . . In our view, to say,
as Banks does, that the law is “free for publication to all” is to
expand, not factually limit, the extent of its availability.352
In 2020, the court in UpCodes repeatedly reaffirmed the need for access to the
law353 and maintained that the need for this access outweighed the interests of
copyright holders.354 Evoking the Veeck and BOCA (1980) decisions, the court
expressed its concerns about allowing a copyright holder to control access.355
ICC, the plaintiff in UpCodes, argued that it met due process needs because it
provided access to its codes in libraries and on an online site.356 The court stated
that this access argument in Veeck and BOCA357 failed to persuade those courts
since the plaintiffs in those cases (who were ICC predecessors) “would
effectively control the terms of access to the law.”358 Providing limited access to
adopted works at the discretion of the copyright holder was not enough to meet
the public’s need of access to the law.
The courts in UpCodes and Veeck discussed BOCA and referenced the First
Circuit Court’s concern in that case that the rights of a copyright holder should
not override the need for access to the law.359 The court in BOCA expressed
doubts that BOCA’s “virtual authorship of the Massachusetts building code”
would entitle BOCA “to enforce a copyright monopoly over when, where, and
how the Massachusetts building code is to be reproduced and made publicly
available.”360 The court observed that:
[I]f access to the law is limited, then the people will or may be
unable to learn of its requirements and may be thereby
Id.
Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 17 Civ. 6261 (VM), 2020 WL 2750636, at
*7, *8, *9, *10, *12, *13 n.11, *16, *28 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
354 Id. at *12, *17, *28.
355 Id. at *9-*10.
356 Id. at *13 n.11.
357 See Bldg. Offs. & Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting
that copies of the plaintiff’s building code were required by law to be “maintained” in the
Secretary of State’s office).
358 UpCodes, 2020 WL 2750636, at *13 n.11. The court noted that ICC limited the public’s
use of works that were posted on its website, which the court thought contradicted ICC’s
argument that it provides free access. Id.
359 Id. at *9; Veeck, 292 F.3d at 799-800.
360 BOCA, 628 F.2d at 735.
352
353

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss1/2

52

Jones: Under the Umbrella: Promoting Public Access to the Law

2021]

UNDER THE UMBRELLA

53

deprived of the notice to which due process entitles them . . .
. [T]he holder of a copyright has the right to refuse to publish
the copyrighted material at all and may prevent anyone else
from doing so, thereby preventing any public access to the material . . .
. We cannot see how this aspect of copyright protection can be
squared with the right of the public to know the law to which
it is subject.361
This statement in BOCA summarizes the repeated court decisions to uphold
public needs over copyright holder interests.
B. THE CHALLENGES OF INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE INTO THE LAW

1. Access Issues: Standards Incorporated by Reference into the CFR
The cases discussed above involved works under the government edicts
doctrine or model codes adopted into law. Privately drafted standards
incorporated by reference also provide a conflict between public access and
copyright holder interests. There are challenges, obstacles and limitations that
raise issues about the adequacy of access to these standards. There is not much
guidance, however. In ASTM v. PRO the D.C. Circuit Court focused on fair use
and did not address access, although it adopted a fair use analysis that focused
on whether copied standards were “the law.”362 The only court addressing
adequacy of access to standards incorporated by reference into federal
regulations (IBR Standards) was the district court in the ASTM v. PRO
litigation.363
Judge Katsas in his concurrence in ASTM v. PRO viewed the standards as
“binding legal texts” and noted that “access to the law cannot be conditioned on
the consent of a private party, just as it cannot be conditioned on the ability to
read fine print posted on high walls.”364 While there are provisions in the law for
public access to incorporated standards, the limited paths to access pose many
challenges. Judge Katsas’ reference to Roman Emperor Caligula’s restrictions on
access to laws is a reminder that difficult access can essentially result in no
access.365

Id. at 734-35 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
See Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 447(D.C.
Cir. 2018) (stating that the court would only address fair use).
363 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. Nos. 13-cv-1215, 14-cv0857 (TSC), 2017 WL 473822, at *2, *11 (D. D.C. 2017) (agreeing with the plaintiffs’ argument
that that the plaintiff SDOs provided adequate access as mandated under federal law for IBR
Standards).
364 ASTM v. PRO, 896 F.3d at 458 (Katsas, J., concurring).
365 See supra note 22 for the full Caligula quote.
361
362
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There is federal guidance for accessing the many thousands of standards
incorporated by reference into the CFR, but the copyright holders still control
and determine limits on access.366 In 2014 Professor Nina Mendelson discussed
the challenges of accessing standards incorporated by reference into the CFR
(IBR Standards).367 She expressed concern that “we seem to be returning to a
situation where thousands of federal regulatory standards are increasingly
difficult to locate.”368 This situation, she suggests, is “very similar to the one that
Professor Griswold complained about in 1934 and that prompted Congress to
enact the Federal Register Act.”369
In her article Professor Mendelson tracked certain IBR standards and
documented limitations on access such as: (1) locations for physically accessing
IBR were generally limited to the headquarters of an SDO and the Office of the
Federal Register (OFR) in Washington, D.C.;370 (2) standards might be available
for sale from the SDO, but the price could be exorbitant;371 (3) older versions of
IBR standards might not be available;372 and (4) SDO online “reading rooms”
were not easy to locate and had restrictions.373 In 2021, I updated the example
IBR standards and found the same limitations and more. Physical access is still
limited to SDO headquarters and the OFR in D.C. with an appointment

State and local jurisdictions also incorporate and adopt standards. See NIST SPECIAL
PUBLICATION 806, 1996 EDITION STANDARDS ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS, at 1 (Robert
B. Toth, ed.) (noting that many state and local governments base their regulations and codes
on standards that various organizations create). Finding standards incorporated into state and
local laws also can be challenging. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2 (describing problems in
finding incorporated standards at the state level).
367 Mendelson, supra note 163, at 739-44, 761.
368 Id. at 739.
369 Id., at 804. I note that the situation evokes the description in the 1935 House Report
regarding the state of access to federal administrative regulations prior to the creation of the
CFR: “Any attempt to compile a complete private collection . . . would be wellnigh impossible.
No law library, public or private, contains them all.” H.R. REP. NO. 74-280, at 2 (1935) (House
Report relating to the Federal Register Act). This statement is a paraphrase of Erwin
Griswold’s observation in his article Government in Ignorance of the Law - A Plea for Better Publication
of Executive Legislation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 204 (1934).
370 Mendelson, supra note 163, at 743. Access at the OFR was reading room was available only
by appointment. Id.
371 Id.; see also Emily S. Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law, 63 U. Kan. L. Rev.
279, 286, 313-323 (2015) (discussing costs of standards and providing a “comprehensive
analysis of the costs of incorporated standards”); Bremer, supra note 144, at 181–82 (discussing
the pricing of IBR Standards).
372 Id. at 761.
373 Id. at 743 n.30; 753, 753 n.84. The SDO could revoke access to the materials in the reading
rooms at any time.
366
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scheduled in advance in writing.374 A check of two SDO online reading rooms
revealed that they both required registration to access content and there were no
print or download options.375 Purchasing IBR Standards from an SDO could be
costly376 and subject to license agreements.377
After expressing concerns about the accessibility of IBR Standards, Professor
Mendelson maintains “that a law is not formally secret is not sufficient for notice
purposes. If those burdened with obligations cannot learn their substance
without paying hundreds of dollars to an SDO or traveling to Washington, D.C.,
the law is not meaningfully public.”378 Professor Mendelson also states that
“[a]ccess to the text of these rules cannot just be a formality; the text must be

See Code of Federal Regulations Incorporated by Reference, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html#why (last visited January
7, 2022) (describing how to access incorporated materials in person).
375 For example, ASTM maintains a “reading room” for read-only access to IBR standards.
ASTM International, Reading Room, https://www.astm.org/products-services/readingroom.html (last visited January 7, 2022). To access the reading room, ASTM requires
registration which involves providing an email address and password. ASTM International,
Create
an
Account,
https://www.astm.org/customer/account/create/?acc_class=b2c&acc_type=b2c
(last
visited January 7, 2022). It is unclear what happens to the data provided in the registration. In
its “Privacy Policy,” ASTM notes that it retains data provided with purchases for seven years.
There is no mention of “registration” data. ASTM International, Privacy Policy,
https://www.astm.org/privacy-policy (last visited January 7, 2022). Access to the reading
room of another SDO, the American Petroleum Institute (API), requires an email address,
first and last name, company and country to register. American Petroleum Institute, IBR
Reading Room, Login or Create an Account, https://publications.api.org/ (last visited January 7,
2022).
376 For example, a sixty-page ASME standard is available for sale from ASME at a cost of $90
for a print or DRM enabled PDF copy. https://www.asme.org/codes-standards/find-codesstandards/b31g-manual-determining-remaining-strength-corrodedpipelines?productKey=A1211Q:A1211Q (Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength
of Corroded Pipelines, B31G – 2012). This is an updated version of a standard Professor
Mendelson tracked in her article. See Mendelson, supra note 163, at 740 n.12 (referencing 10
C.F.R. pt. 851, App. A, sec. 4(b)(2)(x) (2013)).
377 For example, ASTM provides a license agreement for a “single PDF download.” ASTM
International, Copyright and Permissions, https://www.astm.org/copyright-and-permissions
(last visited
January 7, 2022). The terms and conditions agreement states that: “This is not a sale; all right,
title and interest in the ASTM Product or Documents (in both electronic file and hard copy)
belong to ASTM.” The agreement contains extensive restrictions on the purchased document.
Go to https://www.astm.org/copyright-and-permissions and click on “single PDF
download” for the agreement.
378 Mendelson, supra note 163, at 805.
374
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readily, meaningfully available to the public, including substantial levels of access
without charge.”379
2. Access Issues: Standards Incorporated by Reference in State Laws and Regulations
The previous discussion focused on access to IBR Standards in the C.F.R.
There are also challenges in accessing standards incorporated into reference in
state laws. One of the cases, Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. v. Capital Terminal Co.,
resulted in denial of a claim due to the inability to locate a copy of an
incorporated standard.380 This case illustrates the need to access older versions
of standards and the consequences when those standards are not available. In
Getty, critical to Capital’s counterclaim in this 2004 case was the text of a 1987
standard incorporated by reference into state law.381 Neither Capital nor the
district court could locate a copy of the 1987 standard.382 The 1987 standard,
rather than a more version of current standard, was needed to define obligations
under the state statute in effect at the time of the relevant agreement.383 The
district court granted Getty’s motion for judgment as a matter of law since
Capital could not produce the text of the standard which the jury needed to make
a decision.384 The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of the
motion and its “conclusion that Capital's case failed for lack of an essential
element.”385
In a 2017 case, Bellwether Properties, LLC v. Duke Energy Indiana, Inc.386, the
Indiana Supreme Court had difficulty in obtaining a copy of an electrical safety
code incorporated by reference into state law.387 This difficulty led the court to

Id. at 806-07.
Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. v. Cap. Terminal Co., 391 F.3d 312, 321 (1st Cir. 2004).
381 Id. at 316, 317.
382 Id. at 317, 320. A concurring judge noted that the incorporated standard was “privately
authored, published, and copyrighted . . . . [I]t [was] neither reproduced in the [state] statute
books nor retrievable via commonly used legal research methods.” Id. at 330. All that was
available was a more recent version. Id. at 317.
383 Id. at 316 n.5 (noting that the statute had since been repealed but was in effect at the time
of the relevant documents).
384 Id. at 321.
385 Id.
386 87 N.E.3d 462, 465 (Ind. 2017).
387 Id. at 468. The parties in the lawsuit had not provided a copy in the record on appeal. Id. A
court employee attempted to obtain a copy from a state office. She determined that she must
go into the office by appointment and could only inspect the code. The office would not
provide copies or allow anyone to remove the code for copying. The court found a copy of
the code posted online. Id. In one of its briefs in the ASTM v. PRO case, PRO discussed the
Bellwether case and stated that it had posted the copy of the code that the court in Bellwether
accessed. Appellant Public.Resource.Org’s Consolidated Reply Brief 3-5, ASTM v. PRO, 896
F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-7035). PRO also discussed the Getty case in this brief.
379
380
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raise sua sponte the issue of whether the code was “reasonably accessible” to the
plaintiff, who was supposed to have knowledge of it.388 The court questioned
why the state continued to use incorporation by reference when the technology
existed to provide online access.389 The court noted that there is a presumption
that people know the law, and “central” to this presumption “is that the law is
accessible.”390 For authority, the court relied on and quoted a 1906 Indiana
Supreme Court case, Ex Parte Brown,391 but the quote was actually from the Banks
v. West Publishing decision 131 years before: “freedom of access to the laws . . .
should be co-extensive” with knowledge of the law.392
3. Access to IBR Standards – The Role of Government
Ensuring due process is the responsibility of the government.393 The current
federal system of using incorporation by reference is not compatible with due
process requirements. Federal law directs federal agencies to incorporate by
reference, but the incorporated works must be “reasonably available.”394 If the
incorporated materials are difficult to access, costly, or unavailable except in
print, arguably they are not “reasonably available.” The lack of availability could
lead a party expected to comply with the incorporated standard to argue that
there is a lack of “fair notice” of the requirements.395 As Professor Mendelson
argues: “Due process requires that regulated entities receive fair notice of their

Id. at 467, 468, 470.
Id. at 469 (“[I]ncorporating copyright-protected materials by reference seems antiquated
and at odds with government's obligation to provide meaningful access to laws.”).
390 Id. at 467.
391 78 N.E. 553 (Ind. 1906).
392 Banks & Bros. v. W. Publ'g Co., 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886), quoted in Ex Parte Brown,
78 N.E. at 559.
393 See Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 964 (2005) (“Under our
Constitution, there must be a ‘state action’ to trigger the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or a comparable federal action to invoke the Fifth Amendment. Therefore,
process is only due when the public sector, rather than the private, takes action.”); Ghosh, supra
note 149, at 457-58 (discussing how private code drafting organizations are not the state and
are not responsible for due process violations).
394 NTTAA, supra note 160; OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119, supra note 160; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)
(2006).
395 See Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 790 F.2d 154, 156
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he due process clause prevents . . . validating the application of a
regulation that fails to give fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires.”); Mendelson,
supra note 163, at 761 (stating that if “the text is available only in the Washington, D.C., reading
room . . . [this] might well supply a regulated entity with a due process defense to enforcement
of the rule.”). As the court in Bellwhether noted, the degree of difficulty in accessing
incorporated codes or standards can affect expectations regarding a party’s knowledge.
Bellwhether, 87 N.E. 3d at 468, 470.
388
389
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obligations before the government sanctions them for noncompliance. This due
process requirement must imply some reasonable level of public access.”396
The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 and the
E-Government Act of 2002 expanded requirements for federal government
agencies to enhance government transparency and public access to agency
actions through electronic means.397 Given the obligations and expectations
embodied in these laws,398 it is questionable whether the limited physical access
and lack of government-provided online access to IBR standards meet
availability requirements.399
To address the issue of fair notice and to comply with the purposes of these
acts,400 there have been calls for reforms in the federal IBR system that could
include government-provided online access.401 One effort for change was a
petition filed in 2012 advocating that OFR redefine “reasonably available” in
light of changes in “law and technology” that transformed access to government
materials.402 The OFR, after reviewing comments on the proposal, did not

Mendelson, supra note 163, at 768.
Strauss, supra note 158, at 523-24. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 [hereinafter E-FOIA] (providing for public access
to government information in an electronic format); E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 [hereinafter E-Government Act] (enhancing public access to
government information through Internet-based technology).
398 The Senate Report relating to E-FOIA discusses a requirement that agencies have copies
of records related to popular FOIA requests, such as files related to assassinations of public
figures, “made available for public inspection and copying, including by computer
telecommunications or other electronic means.” S. REP. NO. 104-272 at 13 (1996). The
purpose of this requirement seems to be to provide faster access to often requested files as
well as reduce agency time. Yet, the government allows the public to hunt for standards that
are law and require compliance.
399 Peter L. Strauss, Agencies Should Pay for any Copyrighted Materials They Incorporate by Reference,
REGULATORY REV. (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.theregreview.org/2011/12/01/agenciesshould-pay-for-any-copyrighted-materials-they-incorporate-by-reference/.
400 The purposes of E-FOIA were, among other things, to “foster democracy by ensuring
public access to agency records and information” and “improve public access to agency
records and information.” E-FOIA, supra note 397, at § 2(b)(1)-(2), 110 Stat. at 3048. The
purposes of the E-Government Act were, among other things, to “us[e] information
technology to increase access, accountability, and transparency” and to “enhance public
participation in Government by electronic means.” E-Government Act, supra note 397, at §
206(a), 116 Stat. at 2915-16.
401 See Mendelson, supra note 163, at 799-800 (discussing IBR reforms).
402 Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 11414, 11414-15 (Feb. 27, 2012) [hereinafter
2012 Petition] (noting the existence of agency online reading rooms where “unlimited volumes
of materials may be stored and hyperlinked, and made readily searchable by common webbased tools”). The 2012 petition advocated for changes in the IBR rules including providing
free public access. 77 Fed. Reg. at 11415. For a discussion of the 2012 Petition, see Mendelson,
396
397

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss1/2

58

Jones: Under the Umbrella: Promoting Public Access to the Law

2021]

UNDER THE UMBRELLA

59

redefine “reasonably available.” Instead, it just asked that agencies using IBR to
summarize the incorporated works and discuss how the materials are “reasonably
available.”403
The use of incorporation by reference in federal regulations was to minimize
the bulk of printed statutes and regulations.404 This use now seems antiquated
when laws are available online and the technology exists to provide access to all
materials.405 With online means available to provide public access, the only
reason to continue the incorporation by reference practice seems to be
protection of copyright interests.406 It is difficult to see how the current use of
IBR Standards supports the goals of federal law to promote public access407
when access is primarily left to SDOs who can control access in a way that
furthers their interests.408 The SDOs are the only suppliers of these standards
supra note 163, at 745 and Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law, supra note 371,
at 285 (discussing OFR changes).
403 79 Fed. Reg. 66267, 66278 (Nov. 7, 2014) (codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. § 51.7(2)(ii)) (changes
effective Jan. 6, 2015).
404 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(c)(2012) (stating that publications eligible for incorporation by reference
must “[s]ubstantially reduce[] the volume of material published in the Federal Register.”). This
language was replaced in 2014 to say that the publication “[d]oes not detract from the
usefulness of the Federal Register publication system.” Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed.
Reg. 66267, 66278 (Nov. 7, 2014) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(2)(ii)) (changes effective Jan. 6,
2015); see Mendelson, supra note 163, at 742 (noting the original reason for incorporation by
reference).
405 See Strauss, supra note 158, at 523 (contending that there is no longer justification for
incorporation by reference); Cf. Bellwhether, 87 N.E.3d at 469 (questioning the continuing use
of incorporation by reference in the context of state regulations).
406 2012 Petition, supra note 402, at 11416 (“Since having the Internet eliminates any concern
about having to print excessive materials, protecting copyright interests is the only possible rationale for
permitting incorporation by reference of materials members of the public might be required
to pay to see.”)(emphasis added)).
407 See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 250 (1966) (“Every
agency shall make available to the public” a wide range of information); E-FOIA, supra note
397, at § 2(b), 110 Stat. at 3048 (“The purposes of this Act are to . . . foster democracy by
ensuring public access to agency records and information; . . . improve public access to agency
records and information . . . .”).
408 Mendelson, supra note 163, at 753 (“[T]he revenue-maximizing choice for SDOs-particularly for a standard that is not simply voluntary but is incorporated into binding federal
law--may well not be to charge the cheapest price.”). Professor Mendelson notes that even the
SDOs that provide online reading rooms “continue to claim a copyright and the entitlement
to revoke free access at any time.” Id. In a brief in the ASTM v. PRO case, PRO emphasized
that any access to the standards was at issue because of the SDO plaintiffs’ insistence that
“they should be able to control access to the standards at issue, including the right not to make
them available at all.” PRO illustrated this point by noting that “one plaintiff discontinued
sales of its standards in order to stimulate sales of a later edition that had not yet been
incorporated into law.” Appellant Public.Resource.Org’s Final Consolidated Opening Brief at
38-39, Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437 (D.C.
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incorporated into law, and therefore can command a higher price, particularly
for older standards still in use.409 Some standards may not be available through
SDOs even if they remain incorporated by reference.410 This situation recalls the
admonition of counsel for Peters in Wheaton v. Peters: “The law cannot and ought
not to be made the prisoner” of anyone.411
Whatever proposal there may be for the government to provide access would
require negotiation with SDOs as copyright holders412 and would be subject to
their decisions to limit how the materials are accessed or available, much as they
limit access on their own sites. These arrangements would not fully promote
public access. The IBR standards that are law would still be “prisoners” of the
copyright holders.413 Government reform, therefore, is not necessarily a way to
ensure access.
4. Access to IBR Standards – The Role of Innovators
If there are not copyright restrictions on works adopted into law, then this
access could encourage non-government entities to not only provide access to
the works, but to add innovative ways for searching and other uses. Access to
the law was important in the nineteenth century for companies that were not
only compiling reports but providing innovative access tools such as digests.
While these companies were acting for commercial purposes, their access to the
law allowed them to innovate. An example was West Publishing, which was an
advocate for open access in the nineteenth century. The company would in the
future pursue copyright claims,414 but in the nineteenth century West Publishing
Cir. Feb. 14, 2018) (No. 17-7035) (consolidated with Appeal No. 17-7039), 2018 WL 925286,
at *39. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and Entry of a Permanent Injunction, American Ed. Rsch. Ass’n v.
Publc.Resource.Org, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00857-TSC (D.D.C. December 15, 2015), Doc. No.
60-1 (stating that plaintiff discontinued sales of an earlier version of standards when a new
version was published “to encourage sales of the newly-revised edition”). This case was a
parallel case to ASTM v. PRO that was consolidated with ASTM v. PRO. See supra note 170
(discussing the consolidation).
409 See Mendelson, supra note 163, at 753 n.84, 804. See also Strauss, supra note 158, at 509–10
(presenting an example of how the incorporation into law affects the price of the incorporated
standards).
410 See Mendelson, supra note 163, at 761 (discussing that SDOs do not continue to make
incorporated standards available).
411 Precis of Argument by Counsel for Wheaton. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 622.
412 See 2012 Petition, supra note 402, at 11416 (suggesting that to make IBR Standards freely
available on agency websites, agencies might have to pay license fees).
413 Cf. Strauss, supra note 158, at 524 (“[O]nly SDO copyright claims obstruct ready public
access to rulemaking proposals and to resulting legal obligations.”).
414 See, e.g., W. Publ’g Co. v. Lawyers’ Coop. Publ’g Co., 79 F. 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1897) (claiming
infringement of digest entries); W. Publ’g. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833, 834(2d
Cir. 1910) (claiming defendant, a publisher of legal encyclopedias, had infringed); W. Publ’g.
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was often a plaintiff seeking access415 or was in the background of cases.416 In
one case, the court “commended” West Publishing for expediting publication of
judicial opinions.417 In addition to prompt publication of decisions, West
Publishing developed a “full package of innovations” for organizing and
“filtering” decisions.418
In a more modern setting, in an amici brief filed in GA v. PRO, nonprofit and
for-profit companies engaged in development stressed the necessity of open
access to the law to support their innovations in research platforms and other
legal research tools.419 When faced with copyright control over the law, some
had to scale back their efforts.420
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of how access to incorporated standards can improve—through
government overhaul or innovators—if “law as law” remains tightly under
control of copyright holders, then public access will be compromised. From
Banks & Brothers and Little, Brown, & Co. in the nineteenth century to modern
day SDOs, copyright holders have prioritized economic interests over public
access to the law.421

Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1221 (8th Cir. 1986) (challenging star pagination
use in Lexis); see also Patterson & Joyce, supra note 34, at 721-22 (discussing W. Publ’g Co. v.
Mead Data Central, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Minn. 1985)). In my view, West’s claims over
non-public domain materials in its reporters results in encapsulation of the law. This
encapsulation limits access.
415 See William L. Anderson, Copyright Protection for Citations to a Law Reporter: West Publishing Co.
v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 71 MINN. L. REV. 991, 1034 n.5 (1987) (listing and discussing cases
in which West Publishing was involved).
416 See, e.g., Nash, 6. N.E. 559, 560 (1886) (involving a publisher, Little, Brown & Co., that
caused the state reporter to withhold access to opinions because West Publishing and other
publishers were accessing the opinions).
417 Ex parte Brown, 78 N.E. 553, 559 (1906).
418 Peter W. Martin, Pre-Digital Law: How Prior Information Technologies Have Shaped Access to and
the Nature of Law, 30 L. REV. JURIDIQUE, THẺMIS 153, 163-164 (1996) (describing West
Publishing’s innovative additions); see GEORGE S. GROSSMAN, LEGAL RESEARCH: HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ELECTRONIC AGE 78-79 (discussing some of West Publishing’s
products and their effect on law in the United States).
419 Brief of Amici Curiae Next-Generation Legal Research Platforms and Databases in Support
of Respondent at 18, (Oct. 16, 2019), GA. v. PRO, 140 S.Ct. 1498 (20202019) (No. 18-1150)
(“Enhancing competition and driving innovation require that the legal core, a key input to
innovative legal tools, be free from copyright.”).
420 See id. at 11 (“Indeed, fear of potential copyright liability has already chilled legal innovation,
including by some amici.”).
421 See, e.g., discussion supra Sections I.B. (focusing on nineteenth century cases); I.D. (focusing
on nineteenth century cases); III.B.(focusing on standards).
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The adoption and incorporation of model codes and standards into law are
examples422 of what Professor Ghosh describes as the use of copyright for
“privatization.”423 Government entities have delegated their responsibilities to
model code organizations and SDOs for an important government function—
the drafting of legislation.424 While this delegation has advantages, the downside
is that the works, although they are enforceable as law, are under the control of
the copyright holder.425 Professor Ghosh argues that this situation undermines
“the values of deliberative democracy” and results in turning the drafting process
into a market.426 The “democratic process” becomes a “discrete transaction
between a demander of laws (the legislature) and a supplier of laws (the drafting
organization).”427 When the government has to negotiate to meet due process
obligations, copyright is an obstacle.428 To provide better access to IBR
Standards, the government might have to pay SDOs.429 For the government to

See Ghosh, supra note 149, at 393, 452-53, 457 (discussing the use of model codes).
Id. at 395 (“[P]rivatization [is] the delegation of the decision-making function historically
assigned to a governmental entity to a non-governmental entity.”).
424 Id. at 461 (“In the model code cases, copyright is used to privatize the government function
of law making by allowing private code drafters to finance the creation of critical public
infrastructure - legal code.”). See id. at 457 (discussion of how copyright facilitates privatization
in this situation).
425 For example, in Veeck, the plaintiff created model codes that it encouraged governments
to adopt. Veeck, 493 F.3d at 793-94. Once local governments adopted the model codes into
law, however, the plaintiff sued when the defendant posted the text of the law which was the
same as that of the model code. Id. at 794. See Ghosh, supra note 149 at 458-61 for a discussion
of how courts have handled situations in which copyright holders claimed rights in codes
adopted into law. These courts preserved access to the law.
426 Id. at 458.
427 Id.
428 As Professor Strauss notes with regard to IBR standards, “only SDO copyright claims
obstruct ready public access to rulemaking proposals and to resulting legal obligations.”
Strauss, supra note 158, at 524. This suggests that copyright barriers should be removed. But cf.
Bremer, On the Costs of Private Standards in Public Law, supra note 371, at 294 (discussing problems
with removing copyright protection for incorporated materials). One argument against
diminishing or removing copyright from incorporated standards is a concern that “[c]opyright
also provides its standards developer with the legal right and incentive to ensure that third
parties are not disseminating erroneous or incomplete versions of its the standards. . . .” Id.
The concern about protecting the accuracy and authenticity of the standards echoes an
argument of Banks & Brothers’ counsel in his brief in Banks v. Manchester that if “every one
who chooses” could publish the opinions, then there would be “no way to prevent errors,
omissions and inaccuracies.” These incorrect publications would “unauthorized and
unauthenticated” which “could be of no value to the public and might be of harm.” Brief of
Appellants, at 29-30, Banks v. Manchester 128 U.S. 244 (1888) (No. 45), available at
https://archive.org/details/banksvmanchesterrecord/mode/2up (part of Agreed Record).
429 See Mendelson, supra note 163, at 801-02 (discussing options for providing public access to
standards such as negotiating with the SDOs and providing incentives for them to cooperate
422
423
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have to negotiate a price for public access (and presumably use tax dollars to
pay), seems improper when considering the importance of public needs for
access to the law. Privatization has become a trap for the law.
The recent decisions in GA v. PRO, ASTM v. PRO and UpCodes have affirmed
and further developed the means to support and advance the principle that
members of the public need knowledge of and access to the law. Supporting
unfettered access to the law and the public benefits that flow therefrom should
outweigh copyright concerns. As Professors Patterson and Joyce noted: “For the
most part, the effect of copyright is affirmative . . . . But the effect becomes
negative when it is used to give precedence to private proprietary rights over the
civil rights of citizens.”430

in providing lower licensing charges); 2012 Petition, supra note 402 at 11415-16 (suggesting
that agencies might pay licensing fees to host copies of IBR Standards on their websites).
430 Patterson & Joyce, supra note 34, at 809; see Manchester Brief, supra note 80, at 16 (The state
should not deprive its people of published and accessible laws, “especially where the ground
for such action is apparently based upon the sacrifice of a public benefit to the advancement
of a private end.”).
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VII. APPENDIX

Copyright on the Publications of the Decisions of the Supreme Court
of Ohio, 6 OHIO LAW JOURNAL 197-198 (1884)
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11 WEEKLY LAW BULLETIN 193 (1884)
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